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The first chapter of the dissertation investigates how poor households in developing
countries respond to adverse income developments. I use nationally representative longi-
tudinal data to investigate behavioral responses to the loss of an Old Age Pensioner in
South Africa. I find that household composition adjusts, with an outflow of school aged
children and an inflow of middle-aged females and older adults. The household, on ag-
gregate, also has more people employed. Conditional on compositional stability within
demographic groups, I find large and significant increases in both labor supply and em-
ployment. Policy makers might be concerned with the impact of cash transfers on the
labor supply of non-recipients.
The second chapter examines the effect of the Old Age Pension on retirement behavior
of elderly South Africans. I make use of the rules on age eligibility to measure changes in
various dimensions of labor supply that occur when people reach the pensionable age. I find
significant decreases in employment rates and labor supply. Those who remain employed
beyond the pensionable age are more likely to work in jobs with flexible hours of work,
and work even fewer hours than people in similar jobs who are not pension age-eligible.
The final chapter investigates the impact of changes in the probability of being admitted
into a selective college on students’ SAT score sending behavior. We capture this using a
student’s class rank combined with the Texas Top Ten Percent Rule. In response to dwin-
dling minority enrollment rates, the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M College
1
Station embarked on targeted recruitment programs at previously under-represented high
schools. We evaluate the effectiveness of these programs using individual level SAT data.
We find that score sending is affected by the legal change, and that both targeted recruit-
ment programs were successful in attracting scores. In each case, the effects were manifest
most strongly amongst the students in the top decile of the class. This suggests that




Household responses to adverse income shocks: Pensioner
out-migration and mortality in South Africa
2.1 Introduction
How do households respond to the cessation of cash transfers in developing countries? I
estimate the magnitude of changes in household composition and household labor supply
that occur when a pensioner leaves the household, either due to out-migration or death.
The data used is nationally representative household level matched data from South African
Labour Force Surveys (LFS) from September 2001 to March 2004.
The non-contributory South African Old Age Pension (OAP) forms the backbone of the
South African social security system. Recipiency rates are high amongst the elderly, and
over 77% of Africans who are age-eligible report receiving the pension. In addition, a means
test ensures that the pension disproportionately reaches poorer households. Not only is
coverage widespread, but its value is sufficiently high to generally make the pensioner
the main breadwinner in their households. Case and Deaton (1998) note that in 1993,
the value of the pension was “twice the median household’s per capita income” amongst
African households. Based on the September 2002 LFS, 19.28% of all households report
“pensions and grants” as their main source of income. Amongst households with a member
who is old enough to be eligible, this percentage rises to 63.67% for all households, and
70.17% for African headed households.
Given the importance of the pension, investigating how household’s cope with its loss is
of interest for at least two policy related reasons. First, it can inform us as to how relatively
3
poor families act to mitigate against the effects of adverse economic developments. One
dimension of this involves household responses in terms of household composition. If
the group that constitutes a ‘household’ is itself endogenously determined, then careful
consideration for policies targeted at the household level is warranted. Second, sharing of
pension income within households might lead to non-recipients deciding not to work. On
the other hand, if poor households are liquidity constrained and the pension eases these
constraints, we might observe that employment rates actually increase as a result of the
pension. Estimating the magnitude of the net effect is the primary contribution of this
paper.
To summarize my results, I find significant evidence that the pension does indeed affect
both household composition and labor force participation of non-recipients. The largest
and most robust effects are observed for older adults. Households re-organize such that
they have more adult time in the labor force, more non-pension aged adult residents who
are not employed, and a decrease in the number of school-aged children. I find significant
increases in labor force participation and employment amongst resident non-pensioners.
2.2 Background
Lund (1993) provides an introduction to the OAP as we see it today. As stated pre-
viously, the pension is means tested, and provides a relatively generous cash transfer to
recipients. Eligibility depends only on age, nationality and satisfying the means test. The
age-eligibility threshold is 60 for women and 65 for men. The level of the means test is set
fairly high, so that most of the elderly receive the grant. Moreover, it is based on individual
income for the unmarried elderly, or joint spousal income for married couples, and hence
should not have distortionary ‘implicit taxation’ effects for other household members.
The value of the pension is adjusted periodically, usually on an annual basis, to adjust
for inflation. In 2002 and 2003, the value of the pension was set at 620 and 700 rands per
month respectively. Adjusting for consumer inflation1, and converting using the prevailing
1The deflator used is the official Consumer Price Index released by Statistics South Africa.
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exchange rate of 6 rand : 1 US dollar, these numbers equate to approximately $125 per
month. This is a large transfer relative to potential wage income, and continues for as long
as the pensioner remains alive and continues to satisfy the means test.
2.3 Related Literature
Several researchers have investigated the effects of pension recipiency on various dimen-
sions of household welfare. Case and Deaton (1998) find that the pension is an effective tool
for redistribution and that the households it reaches are predominantly poor. Furthermore,
the prevalence of three-generation households, as well as ‘skip generation’2 households, re-
sults in the pension disproportionately reaching children in poverty.
Some authors have looked at whether the OAP impacts on the health of recipients or
their household members. Duflo (2000) finds a discontinuous increase in girls’ height for
age for children living with pension eligible persons. This increase is significant and is
realized on average only when the pension recipient is a woman. Duflo (2003) reports
similar evidence that the pension is shared between members of the household. Moreover,
the sharing of recipients’ income from pensions is differentiated by gender. Case (2001)
finds that the health of all household members is improved as a result of the pension.
Others have asked the question; ‘How do other members of the household respond
when a member becomes pension eligible’? Bertrand et al (2003) analyse cross sectional
data and find that having a pension eligible person in the household has a statistically
significant and negative impact on the labor supply of prime aged resident males in the
household. Edmonds (2003) considers the impact of the OAP on child labor supply and
schooling attendance. Ranchhod (2006) finds that the pension causes retirement amongst
the recipients themselves. Posel et al (2006) find that the pension actually increases the
labor supply of non-resident household members by financing labor migration towards
areas with better employment prospects.
Jensen (2003) questions whether household disposable income increases by the full value
2Households with grandparents and grandchildren but non-resident parents.
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of the pension. He estimates that crowding out of remittances by pensions is large and
significant. On average, every rand of pension income received by the elderly is met with a
0.25 to 0.30 rand decrease in remittances received from the pensioner’s children. Pension
income is thus de facto shared with family members even when they do not reside with
the pensioner.
Edmonds et al (2005) find that household composition itself is affected by someone
becoming pension age-eligible. They find a decrease in the number of prime working-age
women, and an increase in the number of children younger than five and young women of
childbearing age. Hamoudi and Thomas (2005) go further, and find evidence that the OAP
results in compositional changes consistent with sorting on the basis of unmeasured per-
sonal characteristics. This result poses a challenge to much of the prior research conducted
on cross-sectional data.
Given that the pension seems to be so important in sustaining the poor and the elderly
in South Africa, a natural question to consider is how do these households cope when the
pension income stops. A paper which asks a similar question, inter alia, is presented by
Ardington et al (2007). Using individual level longitudinal data from a poor rural area
in the KwaZulu-Natal province, they investigate changes in labor supply amongst both
migrant and resident household members as a function of the pension. In their dataset,
after controlling for individual level fixed effects, they find that both the migration decision
as well as labor supply are positively affected by pension receipt. Moreover, they find
asymmetries in the effects of the pension on household members who are already migrant
laborers, as compared to those who are potential migrants.
In this paper, I answer the question: ‘How does household composition and labor market
activity of resident household members change at the same time that we observe the
departure of the pensioner’, either due to out-migration or death. This question has not
been thoroughly investigated in the literature to date. A second major contribution is that




The most basic model of household formation assumes that households form for the
production of some non-tradeable good in which there are economies of scale (Becker,
1973). In this paper, I assume that household composition and labor supply of household
members are both endogenous outcomes to changes in non-labor income. Various authors
have commented on the fact that inter-household migration occurs in response to the
pension; see Keller (2004), Edmonds et al (2005) and Posel et al (2006).
Economic theory is fairly clear on the effect of a loss of outside income on labor supply
in a non-credit constrained household. Assuming that leisure is a normal good, we would
expect people to be more likely to work when the pensioner leaves the household. This
could be manifest in terms of home production or market based work.3 In this context
however, an increase in a member’s willingness to participate in market based work must
depend on their time available to increase their work hours. For example, if all 30 years
olds are already engaged in market related work, then we cannot observe an increase in
their labor force participation (LFP). We would thus expect the response to be greatest
amongst those groups who have time to work and whose wages are relatively high (amongst
those household members not currently working).
The story becomes more complicated when one considers the role of the pensioner within
the household. Suppose, for example, that the pensioner looked after household children.
Then there exists the possibility that a resident adult has to leave the labor market to
assist with child care. On the other hand, if the pensioner is ill and requires care within
the household, their departure would free up some other member’s time and possibly allow
for greater labor market activities.4
Economic theories of the family and household formation are also unclear about what
3Data limitations preclude me from considering the effects on home production.
4This latter scenario seems unlikely given that the amount of time reportedly spent by adults on care giving to the elderly
is almost zero. See Ranchhod and Wittenberg (2007) for details.
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would happen to household composition. If the pensioner provided child care, we might
expect non-resident family adults to take up residence in the household. On the other
hand, the household may have to send adult members out of the household to become
migrant laborers in other regions, which is consistent with the model by Rosenzweig and
Stark (1989). In contrast, the model presented by Ardington et al (2007) incorporates
liquidity constraints and assumes that migrant laborers initially need to draw resources
from the original sending household. In this scenario, the loss of pension income would lead
to a decrease in out-migration of adults, and a return of some migrants into the household.
A different compositional response could be for the household to send children to live with
members of their kin network in other households.5
The prediction of the effects on household composition is thus by no means unambigu-
ous. Ultimately, the question remains to be informed by empirical analysis.
2.5 Data, Sample Selection, and Related Issues
2.5.1 Sample selection
The data I use comes from the South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS). These
are nationally representative household level surveys that are conducted with a biannual
frequency, in March and September of each year. They contain a complete household roster,
demographic information such as age, race, gender and education for each respondent, and
detailed information on labor force participation, employment, occupation, hours worked
and earnings for all household residents aged 16 and above. In some waves there is also
basic information about the quality of the household’s physical dwelling structure, home
ownership, and the relative importance of various forms non-labor related earnings. These
latter are household level variables.
I make use of data from wave 4 through wave 9 of the LFS in this paper (i.e. Sept 2001
- March 2004). Since most of the analysis I conducted is at the household level, I collapsed
all the relevant information to the household level. Table 2.1 shows the initial sample sizes
5Fostering of African children is not uncommon in South Africa. See for example, Beittel (1992) and Sagner and Mtati
(1999).
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in the cross-sections, and the subsequent sample after each additional restriction discussed
below is imposed. Initially, there are 163197 unique household numbers (within waves)
across all of the waves combined.
The question on whether a person receives the pension or not is asked only of those
who are not currently employed. Since the means test is relatively generous, a non-trivial
proportion of the working elderly could also be receiving the pension. Moreover, the LFS
is structured to classify a broad range of activities as ‘employment’, which exacerbates
the problem.6 I therefore decided to make use of the legal age requirements as proxies
for pension income, which is consistent with what almost all researchers investigating
the effects of the OAP have done. For this reason, I excluded all households which had
any household members’ age as unknown. I also focus exclusively on African headed
households.7 Africans comprise the majority of the population, are disproportionately
poor, and conditional on age-eligibility, are highly likely to be receiving the pension. In all
of the September waves combined (i.e. wave 4, 6 & 8), 88.5% of African headed households
that included at least one pension-aged member reported that someone in the household
receives the old age pension.
From waves 4 to 9, the LFS contained a 20% out-rotation component of dwellings.8
Thus, theoretically at least, 80% of dwellings were revisited between any two six month
periods. The essence of my analysis is to identify households that we observe in two
subsequent waves of the LFSs, identify those which had a pensioner in the ‘first’ wave and
‘lost’ that pensioner by the next one, and measure the magnitude of other changes that
occur in such households as well. In its most basic form, this is simply a ‘before and after’
comparison.
6In September waves, there is a household level module which asks, ‘Does any person in this household receive an Old
Age Pension?’, but this is not present in the subsequent March wave.
7Technically, I included households in which the eldest member is an African. Given that the eldest member is generally
the household head, and the infrequency with which multi-racial households are observed in the data, this captures the race
of the household head accurately in almost all cases.
8Source: Statistics South Africa Labour Force Survey metadata documents.
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2.5.2 Measurement Error
Measurement Error arising due to false matches
One challenge to the analysis is measurement error arising due to the possibility of false
matches. Since identification is based on the idea that a pensioner’s departure from a
household will lead to additional responses from the remaining household members, it is
essential that I do, in fact, observe the same household in each of the two waves. However,
this is a dwelling level panel, and is thus not necessarily the same household over time.
To minimize this potential problem, I included only those dwellings where at least one
resident member was included in the Statistics South Africa9 (StatsSA) individual level
panel, and has the same race, gender, and similar ages in wave t and t + 1.10 StatsSA
recently invested considerable resources to extract an individual level panel from this rotat-
ing dwelling level panel. The match quality is likely to be good, since they use the dwelling
identifier information, demographic characteristics, as well as the confidential first and last
name of the respondent to identify the person level matches.
On the other hand, the individual level match rate was far from complete, even af-
ter accounting for migration and the rotation pattern.11 McLaren Z (2007) reports that
between 46.67% and 66.40% of individuals in the cross-sections survive into the matched
panel. This is considerably less than the expected upper limit of 80%. The author presents
evidence that a major reason for the attrition is due to household non-response in a sub-
sequent wave. This is supported by the observation that the distribution of match rates
within households is strongly bimodal, with large spikes at zero and one, and a relatively
sparse density in between. It is also possible that the dwelling that was ‘revisited’ was in
fact a different physical dwelling to the original one surveyed in the prior wave. In shanty
towns in urban areas, and mud huts in rural areas, dwellings could well be impermanent
structures.
I excluded dwellings where there was more than one household on the property, since
9Statistics South Africa is the official national statistics organization, and is responsible for conducting the LFS.
10By ‘similar’ age I required that the 0 ≤ aget+1 − aget ≤ 1.
11Approximately 5% of residents in waves 5 - 9 reported that they were not living there 6 months ago.
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this represented a greater risk of false matches than single household properties.12 The
impact of each of these criteria on the sample size is shown in Table 2.2. Of African headed
households living in single dwelling properties, I match about 76% of households across
waves, which is close to the 80% I would expect from the rotation pattern.13 Restricting
the sample further to those households with at least one ‘good’ individual level match
reduces the sample size by roughly one third, from 68,413 to 45,582 households.14 Finally,
I included only households with at least one person who was pension age-eligible in wave
t.
I am thus able to identify 12,342 households that had a pension-aged member in wave
t, where the ‘pensioner’15 is absent in wave t + 1 for some subset of these households.
There are also 444 households that show a net increase in the number of resident
pensioners by the subsequent wave. These I excluded from the analysis for various reasons.
First, the substantive question is about how households cope with the loss of the pensioner
and the related cash transfer. The question of the impact of pension receipt has been
widely studied already, albeit using cross-sectional data. Second, the date of pension
eligibility should be fully anticipated, and so only liquidity constrained households are
likely to respond. In contrast, the date of the departure of the pensioner, particularly if
due to death, is a stochastic variable. Third, it is difficult to separate between actual aging
into the pension and age misreporting, which is discussed below. Finally, the sample size
is much smaller, which results in limited statistical power.
Measurement Error arising due to ‘Age Heaping’
Of the remaining 11,898 households, there are 10266 ‘Keeper’ households which have
no change in the net number of pensioners between wave t and wave t + 1. There are also
12StatsSA indicated that the ‘hhid’ were maintained by property across waves, but not necessarily for dwellings within
properties. Of the households that satisfied every other requirement for inclusion in the sample, this excluded 6.25% of
households.
13Some of the remaining slippage is likely to occur if a property experiences a change in the number of dwellings between
waves.
14This is slightly better than the individual match rate, and occurs since I only require one individual in the household to
be matched for the household to remain in the sample.
15For the remainder of the paper, I use the word ‘pensioner’ to refer to a person who is age-eligible to receive the old age
pension.
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1632 ‘Loser’ households, which show a decrease in the net number of pensioners between
waves.
A potentially serious measurement error problem arises if people report age imperfectly.
Figure 2.1 shows the ‘Age Heaping’ phenomenon, whereby people tend to round ages to
focal points of multiples of 5 or 10. This results in spikes in the observed age distribution
in the data, and is particularly pronounced amongst the elderly. Suppose that a person’s
reported age in an initial wave is such that I would classify them as pension age-eligible. If,
in a subsequent wave, a person’s age is then reported as below the pensionable age, I would
end up classifying the household as a Loser. In reality, however, the economic environment
of such a household has remained the same. This is also not of the classical measurement
error form, which necessarily results in attenuation bias, since the composition would
simultaneously reflect an increase in the number of older adults who are not yet pensioners.
In response, I only included a subset of Loser households where I can be reasonably
confident that a pension-aged individual did indeed leave the residence. I classified a
household as a ‘strict Loser’ if:
(# residents aged ≥ ((pension-age)+2)) in Wavet > (# residents aged ≥ pension-age) in Wavet+1
Households with someone reported as having age ≥ ((pension-age)+2) are unlikely to
include households that are not actually pensioner households but get incorrectly classi-
fied as such due to the age-heaping. On the other hand, households that are actually
Keeper households with a pensioner aged ≥ ((pension-age)+2)) are unlikely, even with
age-heaping, to report the person’s age as being strictly less than the pensionable age in a
subsequent wave.16
All subsequent analysis in this paper includes only the 1220 ‘strict Loser’ and 10266
‘Keeper’ households.17 The final sample, then, has 11,486 households, observed once in the
16I did not impose a similar restriction on Keeper households. Preliminary analysis revealed that Keeper households are
incredibly stable, such that including only ‘strict Keeper’ households would only limit the sample size but not impact on the
magnitude of the estimated coefficients.
17For the remainder of this paper, the term ‘Loser’ implies a ‘strict Loser’ household.
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‘before’ period (Wavet) and once in the ‘after’ period (Wavet+1) each. Unless specified
otherwise, the unit of observation is thus a household-panel, and some households are
included more than once if they meet all the criteria and appear in more than one panel.
2.5.3 Selection Correction on Observables
The fact that the match rate was relatively poor introduces the possibility of selection
bias. In order for the analysis to be a valid description of what happens to pensioner house-
holds on average, I need to assume that the households that are included are representative
of pensioner households in general. This assumption is unlikely to be true.
The first three columns in Table 2.3 show how the households that meet all the other
criteria18 but did not feature in the panel compare to those that were included in the
panel.19 I compare these two groups for a host of composition and activity variables. For
most variables, t-tests for differences in the means reject the null hypothesis that those
included and those that attrited were drawn from the same underlying population.
To the extent that such attrition arises for observable reasons, we can correct for this
by reweighting our matched sub-sample. For example, if shack dwellers are more likely to
move and are thus less likely to be matched, we can adjust the weighting of those shack
dwellers who we do manage to match. Thus, non-random matching on observables is not
an insurmountable problem per se, as we can use the ‘inverse probability weighting’ (IPW)
method to obtain unbiased estimates.(see Wooldridge 2001, pp 587-590).
I estimated probit models and reweighed the panel sample using the IPW method. The
probits were estimated separately for each wave. The probits were estimated only using
those observations for which I had a corresponding household that I could potentially match
to. This is not too problematic, since the objective is purely a statistical rebalancing one
- I want the group in the panel to look more like that from the full cross-section.
The variables I included were original household composition and location variables,
18That is, they had a pensioner, the eldest person was African, there were no observations with age missing, and there was
only one dwelling on the property.
19All pensioner households from the panel were included in this process, including ‘Gainers’ and Losers who were not ‘strict
Losers’.
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employment data of various demographic groups within the household, and information
about the ownership and characteristics of the physical home. Since the ‘wall type’, ‘home
ownership’ and ‘dwelling type’ questions are only asked in the September waves, for waves
5 & 7 I used the information from the matched household in the subsequent wave.
The regression results suggest that the panel over-represents larger households, urban
households, as well as households whose residents owned their home, none of which is
surprising.20 I then predicted the probability of inclusion in the panel, and all results
in the analysis are weighted by the inverse of this probability, multiplied by the relevant
sampling weights.
A glance at columns III to VI of Table 2.3 suggests that the process was reasonably
successful at achieving its objective of re-balancing the panel to look like the cross-section.
2.5.4 Non-random Selection on Unobservables
A more difficult potential problem occurs if we have non-random matching based on un-
observable characteristics, which persists even after the selection correction on observable
characteristics. If these characteristics are orthogonal to the variables we are interested in,
the estimates will still be unbiased in expectation. If, however, an entire household mi-
grates in search of better economic opportunities upon the death of a pensioner, I cannot
control or adjust for this. I thus need to qualify my findings to those Loser households
where at least one member stays in the same residence.21
2.6 Summary statistics
2.6.1 Dependent Variables
Table 2.4 presents mean household characteristics for Keeper and Loser households
in the initial Wavet period, for each of the major dependent variables that I consider.
Columns 1 & 2 shows the mean household composition for each age-group. The age
classification was somewhat arbitrary, with ‘kids young’ being aged 7 or lower, ‘kids school’
20These are omitted for brevity, but are available from the author upon request.
21It is impossible to determine whether this is a large or small problem in this context.
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aged 8 - 15, ‘youth’ aged 16 - 20, ‘young adults’ aged 21 - 35, ‘middle adults’ aged 36 - 50,
and ‘older adults’ ages 51 - 59 if female, and 51 - 64 if male. 22
Columns 3 & 4, 5 & 6, and 7 & 8 show the mean proportion of people within these age
groups that are working, in the labor force using the broad definition, and in the labor
force using the narrow definition, respectively. In the ‘broad’ category is included anyone
currently employed or willing to work. In the ‘narrow’ category are the employed, and only
those unemployed who are willing to work and had been actively searching for employment
in the past month.
To begin with, Loser households are considerably larger, by more than 1 person on
average. The differences are most pronounced for the younger age groups, up to and
including the young adults. For most groups, the proportion in each of the LFP categories
are somewhat similar. The exceptional category is the middle-aged adult males in the
soon to be Loser households, who are about 10% points more likely to be in the labor
force using either definition, and 8% points more likely to be employed. Also of note is
that employment rates for each age-group are relatively low, for both Keepers and Losers.
Fewer than 1 in 5 young adults, and 1 in 3 middle and older adults are working, in both
Keeper and Loser households.
2.6.2 Income Sources
The survey instrument only captures non-labor income in a crude fashion by asking
“What is the main source of income for this household?”. One possible response is “re-
mittances”. It should be stressed that there is no information on the value of remittances.
Moreover, the question is only asked in waves 4, 6, and 8 (i.e. the September waves).
I calculate the distribution of the responses for the Keeper and Loser households in the
relevant panels. In order for this comparison to be valid, one needs to believe that Loser
(and Keeper) households in waves 5 and 7, were similar to Loser (and Keeper) households
22At age 7, children should legally be enrolled at school, but enrollment become almost universal by age 8 only. Similarly,
16 is the legal age at which a person may drop out of school or enter employment, while at 21, a person becomes a legal
adult.
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in waves 4 and 6.23 For these reasons, the summary statistics presented in Table 2.5 are
only suggestive.
The Keeper households remain fairly stable, which lends credibility to the aforemen-
tioned assumption. About 78% of Keeper households in both time periods report ‘Pensions
and Grants’ as their main income source.24 Loser households look different from Keepers
even in the period prior to their loss. Losers in Wavet are more likely to report ‘Salaries
and Wages’ as their main income source (26.3% vs. 15.6%). This would be expected if
people are anticipating the coming departure of the pensioner.
In Wavet+1, this distribution changes remarkably in Loser households. Pensions and
grants decreases as the main income source from 61.7% in the ‘before’ period, to 35.0%
in the ‘after’ period. This is accounted for mostly be a massive increase in the proportion
that report remittances as their main income source, which increases from 7.3% to 26.0%.
Almost 1 in 5 Loser households experience this transition. Somewhat smaller changes
are observed in the fraction of Losers that report salaries and wages as their main income,
which increases from 26.3% to 31.0%. Given this, and previous research by Jensen (2003), it
seems plausible that there might be offsetting increases in remittances in Loser households.
Changes in both household composition and labor force participation amongst residents
may be muted if there is an offsetting increase in remittances to the household to com-
pensate for the loss of pension income. The observed changes in the distribution of main
income sources lends credibility to the subsequent analysis and interpretation; that Loser
households are indeed experiencing changes that correlate with the loss of pension income.
2.7 Empirical Specification
I next employ multivariate regression techniques to control for additional factors, and
test for the statistical significance of changes in household composition and labor force
participation. I regress the difference in the ‘dependent variable’ for households between
23i.e. Losers at time T0 in waves 5 and 7 were similar to Losers at time T0 in waves 4, 6 and 8.
24These are simply weighted means. South Africa also has several other grants, the most common being the Child Support
Grant.
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Wavet and Wavet+1, on an indicator for whether the household was a Keeper or a Loser.
The regression that I fit is of the form:
Dj,t+1 - Dj,t = β0+ β1losepenj,t + β2Xj,t + εj,t
where j, t denotes a household j in Wavet, and D is the dependent variable of interest.
‘losepenj,t’ is an indicator variable that equals one if household j is a strict Loser be-
tween Wavet and Wavet+1, and 0 if household j is a Keeper between Wavet and Wavet+1.
Additional X variables include an indicator variable for urban areas, provincial dummy
variables, wave dummies, household size 25 and a count variable for the number of pen-
sioners in the household in the initial period. I include this last one since losing one of two
pensioners potentially has smaller effects than losing the only pensioner in the household.
This specification nets out any unobservable but time invariant characteristics that are
specific to a particular household. Moreover, by comparing the change in Loser households
relative to Keeper households, I also expect to net out any effects that arise due to the
aging of the underlying population, as well as changes in economic conditions that affect
members of both groups of households equally.
One mis-specification of the above regression is that I am implicitly assuming that the
households are independent across panels. However, with the rotation policy discussed, this
cannot be true. To correct for this, I estimate robust standard errors which are clustered
at the household level.
2.8 Changes in composition and aggregate household labor force participation
The coefficient on the losepen variable is presented for each of the dependent variables
in Table 2.6. Each coefficient and corresponding standard error is obtained from a separate
regression. The coefficients measure the difference in the mean changes in the dependent
variables between Keepers and Losers, after controlling for all the other X variables. As
stated previously, exploratory analysis revealed that the Keeper households are incredibly
stable, so the coefficients reported are identified primarily using variation within the Loser
25Household size was not included in the regression where the dependent variable was the difference in household size itself.
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households.
I observe large and significant changes in household composition. Not surprisingly,
aggregate household size in Loser households goes down. There is a reduction in the
number of school aged children in the household of 0.063, and an inflow of 0.052 middle
aged females. The largest change in composition occurs amongst the older adults, with a
net increase of 0.279. Thus, more than 1 in 4 losing households get an additional older adult
on average. This in-migration is approximately equally comprised of men and women.
In terms of the numbers employed, almost all the groups considered experience a sig-
nificant increase in the number of employed persons in that group.26 The largest of these
is experienced by the older adults, with a coefficient of 0.102. These are comprised equally
of men and women.
With respect to the number in the labor force, only for the older adults is the increase
significant. This is also the only group for whom the increase in number employed is
exceeded by the increase in the number in the labor force. The increase in number employed
is less than the increase in the number of residents for the adult groups that show a
significant change in composition. Thus, there is also a considerable amount of more adult
time for home production activities in Loser households.
In sum, I find significant evidence that the household re-organizes itself in conjunction
with the departure of a pensioner. Aggregate household level labor supply increases pri-
marily amongst the older adults, while the number of employed adults increases for most
categories. That said, the change in composition makes it difficult to identify an important
policy concern. Are the changes in labor supply (employment) arising due to an increase in
the labor supply (employment) of household members who were previously not in the labor
force (employed), or are they the result of the in-migration of people who were already in
the labor force (employed) and maintained their status. I partially inform this question in
the next two sections.
26The exception, once again, are the middle-aged men.
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2.9 Changes in labor force participation conditional on group level composi-
tional stability
Regression results presented in Table 2.7 are estimated using the same specification as
before, but using a restricted estimation sample. Specifically, only Loser households in
which the net number of residents in the relevant age-group (or gender specific age-group)
remained unchanged across the two waves were included. All Keeper households were
included in the regressions. In these regressions, estimated coefficients are almost surely
the result of behavioral responses amongst household members who were already residing
in the household prior to the departure of the pensioner.27 At the same time, since the
results are obtained off a selected subset of Loser households, one should be cautious about
generalizing these results to the entire set of Losers.
Table 2.7 presents the coefficient and standard error for each group and each dimension
of LFP. I then divide the coefficient estimate by the mean number of Loser households
included in the regression, to measure the size of the coefficient relative to the average size
of the underlying population in the relevant Loser households. Youth seem to be unaffected
by the departure of the pensioner. Young adults are significantly affected, with each
household getting on average 0.059 more active searchers and 0.047 more employed young
adults. In proportionate terms, these are fairly large. The probability of a young adult
in such a Loser household finding employment increases by 5.6% points, and the increases
are larger in terms of labor supply. Of these young adults, we see large proportionate
increases for both genders, but the females seem to be considerably more successful at
finding employment. Indeed, female employment increases by a statistically significant
0.029 (or 6.5% points), whereas the corresponding coefficient for males is 0.009 (or 2.4%
points) and is not significant at any reasonable level.
Amongst middle-aged adults, there are large and significant employment effects, but
27It remains mathematically possible that there is a circular and perfectly offsetting migratory pattern which could explain
these results. However, if I were to impose the additional constraint that the number in the group in Wavet exactly equals
the number in the group who report being resident in the household six months prior to the survey in Wavet+1, this would
reduce the set of Loser households by at most 8 observations in any of the regressions, a further reduction in the number of
Losers of at most 1.5%.
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insignificant, smaller and negative effects for labor supply. There are 0.025 and 0.014 more
middle-aged female and male workers respectively, which represents an increase in the
proportion working of 9.0% points and 9.6% points respectively.28 These are particularly
large proportions. It is also interesting to observe that this is not met with a corresponding
increase in labor supply. The most plausible explanation is that people who were not
employed but in the labor force found employment between waves.
The older adults, particularly the women, seem to be the most responsive in terms of
labor supply.29 Each household gets a significant 0.016 and 0.02 more older women who are
employed or in the labor force using the narrow definition. These correspond to increases
of 14.5% points and 18.1% points respectively.
2.10 Changes in labor force participation conditional on maintained individ-
ual residency
An alternative in similar vein is to analyze LFP responses at the individual level, using
observations who are matched in the StatsSA panel. Advantages of this method are that we
can effectively difference out person specific yet time invariant unobservable characteristics,
interpretation is somewhat simpler, and we are not requiring that the entire demographic
group in the household remain unchanged. A disadvantage is that some people who were
indeed resident in both waves get omitted, since the match rate in not perfect, as discussed
earlier. It is probable that both methods are informative.
Table 2.8 presents individual level regression results for the same set of dependent
variables. The estimation sample is the set of matched individuals in the Loser and Keeper
households already identified. The exact specification is:
Di,g,j,t+1 - Di,g,j,t = β0+ β1losepenj,t + β2Xj,t + εi,g,j,t
where i, g, j, t denotes individual i in demographic group g in household j in Wavet, and D
is the dependent variable of interest. Additional X variables include an indicator variable
28The coefficient for the group with both genders does not need to be a convex combination of the male and female only
coefficients, as the households that are included are not necessarily the same.
29The coefficients for men are not significant, but the % point increase is also fairly large.
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for urban areas, provincial dummy variables, wave dummies and the number of pensioners
in the initial Wavet period. Group status was determined by age in the Wavet period.
Youth and young adults generally show small and statistically insignificant effects on
labor supply. However, there is a 5.7 percentage point decrease in the probability that
youth are in the labor force using the broad definition, and a 7.4 percentage point decrease
in the probability that young female adults are actively searching for employment. This is
in stark contrast to the corresponding estimate in Table 2.7, which showed a 7.3 percentage
point increase in said probability, although that estimate was not statistically significant.
On aggregate, the conflicting results suggests that caution is warranted in making strong
conclusions regarding the effects on youth and young adults.
The results for the middle aged adults, both male and female, are indeed similar to
those obtained using the alternative analysis. We see no significant effects on labor supply,
but large and positive increases in the probability of employment. Middle aged females
and males in Loser households are 9.3 and 8.1 percentage points more likely to be employed
respectively, relative to the comparison group in Keeper households.
Again, the largest results are obtained for the group of older adults. Older adults of
either gender are 10.3 percentage points more likely to be employed, and the increase is
statistically significant at the 5% level for the group with both genders combined. These
are approximately matched by increases in labor supply, which are also large in magnitude.
The increases are larger for women than for men, 12.2 percentage points vs. 10.6 percentage
points using the broad definition, and 13.1 percentage points vs. 8.3 percentage points
using the narrow definition. The coefficients for women are also statistically significant at
the 5% level, which is not the case for men.
In summation then, for these selected observations, I find significant and large increases
in employment rates for middle aged and older adult groups. This is accompanied by
increases in labor supply for the older adults, which is not suprizing since these groups
tend to have relatively low LFP rates to begin with. For the middle-aged adults, there is
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no corresponding increase in labor supply on average. Overall, the finding is all the more
striking given that South Africa’s unemployment rate is about 30% amongst adults, that
most of the unemployed seem to experience chronic long term unemployment30 and that
this occurs within the relatively short space of time between waves.
2.11 Caveats and Robustness checks
It is important to stress that the correlations presented cannot be interpreted as causal
estimates. For example, the out-migration of a pensioner might be a consequence of
the in-migration of other household members, or a change in their employment status.
Alternatively, there may be other factors that simultaneously change the pensioners choice
of residence as well as that of other household members. There are other limitations, partly
due to the data available. I cannot observe why the pensioner left or where she went to. I
also have no information regarding where the new household members came from, where
the out-migrating children go to, nor the activities of any non-resident members. There is
also only limited information about remittances and resource sharing within families but
across physical households. A complete analysis would be able to observe all of these in
order to gain a full understanding of the effects of the pensioner’s departure.
There is one case, however, where the departure of the pensioner is plausibly exogenous,
namely the death of the pensioner. This is still not a panacea, for the family may anticipate
the death of the pensioner and start rearranging the family prior to his death. In this case,
I would be biased away from finding any results, which implies that my ‘death’ estimates
are biased towards zero, and should thus be interpreted as lower bounds of the true effect.
2.11.1 Identification using deaths
One might be concerned about endogenous out-migration of the pensioner. As a ro-
bustness check, I further restricted the sample to include only Losers who experience the
plausibly exogenous event of the death of the pensioner.31 However, only in the wave 5
30See Kingdon and Knight (2002), Banerjee et al (2006)
31Ardington et al note that in the dataset that they used, 77% of Loser households lost their pensioner due to death.
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(March 2003) module were respondents asked about recent deaths in the household. I use
this data to generate an indicator variable for whether an elderly member died recently in a
Loser household.32 This variable is called ‘Death1’, which includes 47 Loser observations.
In the remaining waves, I can only infer deaths indirectly and probabilistically. I do so
using the marital status variable, in combination with the question on who the persons’
spouse is. To do this, I used the ‘good’ individual level matches from the StatsSA panel,
and identified who was married to a pensioner. This is only possible for the subset that
were married in Wavet and lived with their spouse at the time. I then infer death by
identifying those who transitioned to become a widow or widower in Wavet+1. I classify
the variable ‘Death2’=1 if the above criteria are satisfied in a Loser household. This yields
a subset of Losers who lost a pensioner through death. The ‘Death2’ sub-sample has 60
observations.
Regression results for the Death1 and Death2 samples are presented in Tables 2.9 and
2.10 respectively. All Keeper households were included in the regressions. The samples
are necessarily smaller, with fewer statistically significant effects. The ‘treatment’ is also
different. In the case of Death2, I am also selecting on marital status and co-residency of
spouses, which might also have a bearing on the coefficient estimates.
From Table 2.9, there is some evidence that there is an inflow of middle aged adults, but
these are not significant. We do observe a statistically significant increase in the number
of older adults, of 0.151 persons. In general, all the LFP coefficients for the number of
middle and older adults are positive, but are usually not significant. There are marginally
significant and positive LFP coefficients for the numbers of young female adults, middle
aged adults and middle adults males. The category which clearly experiences some change
are the older adults, where there is a marginally significant increase in the number of
employed older adults of 0.065, and a significant increase in the number in the labor force
of about 0.09.
32The ‘age at death’ variable in the ‘deaths’ file in LFS 5 is corrupted, in that the last digit of the variable is missing. This
implies that I only observe the age at death in 10 year intervals. I included all deaths where the age at death was non-missing
and greater than or equal to 60.
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Table 2.10 presents the same regressions results using the spouse-widow identification
of deaths. In this case, very few of the coefficients are significant. We do still observe that
the coefficients for middle aged adults and older adults seem broadly consistent with the
previous estimates. There are more middle aged adults in the household and more in each
category of LFP. For the middle-aged women, there is a marginally significant increase in
the number in the labor force using the broad definition of 0.121. The strongest results
are once again observed for the older adults. The coefficients are all positive, and there is
a marginally significant increase in the number of older adults of both genders combined.
The is also a significant increase in the number of older adults either working or actively
searching for employment.
On aggregate, the death results lends support to a causal interpretation of our aggregate
results. The results, broadly speaking, were similar to those observed for the full sample in
Table 2.6. Despite the small number of observations, we observed positive and significant
effects on both residency patterns and the numbers in the labor force for the older adult
group in particular.
2.12 Discussion
At this point, it is worthwhile to place these findings in the context of the broader OAP
literature. In terms of compositional changes, the results seem consistent with the papers
by Edmonds et al (2006), who analyze only pension receipt, and Ardington et al (2007),
who analyze both pension receipt and loss.
A bit more effort is required to reconcile the various findings regarding labor supply.
Bertrand et al (2003) found that the pension reduces the labor supply of prime aged
individuals in three generational households, using cross-sectional data. Ardington et al
(2007) find quite the opposite using longitudinal data on both resident and non-resident
family members. By considering the effects on both labor migrants as well as residents,
and controlling for person specific unobservable characteristics, they find that prime aged
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household members are significantly more likely to be employed following pension gain.
When considering the loss of a pensioner, and restricting to members of either gender who
were resident in both waves of their study, they find that prime aged residents were 1.1
percentage points less likely to be employed, although the estimate was not statistically
significantly different from zero.
In contrast, this study finds large and significant increases in employment probabilities
for middle-aged adults, and even larger increases in both labor supply and employment
rates amongst older adults.
There are various possible explanations for the difference. First, this paper is limited
by the data to analyzing the effects on people who are resident in the household. I can
make no inference on changes that are manifest for those who out-migrate, in-migrate or
are somehow attached to the household but not resident in either wave.
Second, the age groups considered differ in a way that is likely to be important. Both
Bertrand et al and Ardington et al focus on ‘prime-aged’ adults, which they classify as
individuals aged (16 to 50) and (18 to 50) respectively. This effectively ignores the ‘older
adult’ category, which in this paper seems to be the most sensitive in terms of labor
supply. In addition, pooling together the groups of youths, young adults and middle aged
adults effectively assumes that the responses amongst these groups are the same. In this
study, pooling would lead to an estimate that would be some convex combination of the
effects for youth, young adults and middle aged adults, which would reduce the estimate
on employment for the middle adults and raise it for the other two groups. However, given
that South African pensioners live with considerably more youth and young adults than
middle aged adults on average, the pooled estimate would be much closer to that of the
younger age groups, which was small in magnitude and not statistically different from zero.
A third point of departure from Ardington et al is in the geographic scope of the study.
Whereas this study is based on limited but nationally representative data, theirs is based
on incredibly detailed data obtained from a rural and extremely poor part of the country.
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It is certainly possible that regional differences in local economic conditions might result
in different responses.
To investigate the possibility, I replicated the individual level analysis for the subset
of Keepers and Losers in the rural parts of the KwaZulu Natal province.33 Table 2.11
presents these estimates. For the first time, we find that youth are significantly more likely
to be employed, by 3.4 percentage points. With the exception of female young adults,
none of the LFP categories for young and middle aged adults are significant even at the
10% level.34 The coefficient estimates for employment are also much smaller here than for
the national sample for middle aged adults, at 0.028 vs. 0.088 for middle aged adults of
either gender, 0.031 vs. 0.093 for middle aged females, and -0.032 vs. 0.081 for middle
aged males. The geographic restriction thus results in estimates much closer to those of
Ardington et al. Despite the very small sample sizes, we do still find large and statistically
significant increases in labor supply and employment amongst the older adult females.
2.13 Conclusion
How do poorer households adapt in response to the loss of a valuable economic member?
The results presented were consistent with most of the prior empirical literature. Household
composition and household labor supply both adjust, with an outflow of dependents and
an increase in the number of potentially valuable economic contributors. There is some
evidence that the relative importance of remittances increase as well.
Conditional on compositional stability or maintained residency within demographic
groups, I find large and significant increases in labor force participation and employment
amongst older adults of either gender. I also find large increases in employment rates
amongst middle aged men and women, but no corresponding increase in their labor supply.
While the proportionate increases are large, the base population within these households
are relatively small, and so the average number of people within households that find
33The LFS data does not easily allow for more specific areas of analysis, and even if possible, I would likely run in even
more serious problems of small sample sizes.
34That said, the lack of statistical significance might be due to considerably smaller sample sizes.
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employment is also small.
On the other hand, there are over 2.1 million Old Age Pension recipients in South
Africa, 1.3 million Disability Grant recipients and almost 6.9 million Child Support Grant
recipients.35 Relatively small labor supply and employment elasticities may have a consid-
erable bearing on national employment levels. Policy makers need to consider the effects
of cash grants on the labor supply of non-recipients, while simultaneously being aware that
there are significant other positive outcomes that arise from such grants.
35See Pauw and Mncube (2007) for details.
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2.14 Tables
Table 2.1: Sample Sizes - Cross Sections
Wave # HHID + No Age + African + only 1 HH
missing ‘headed’ on property
4 27,356 27,253 21,138 17,549
5 29,011 28,931 22,093 17,775
6 26,474 26,393 20,073 18,378
7 26,702 26,653 20,282 18,301
8 26,825 26,792 20,373 18,347
9 26,829 26,791 20,397 18,312
Total 163,197 162,813 124,356 108,662
Table 2.2: Sample Sizes - Matched HH Data
Panel # Matched & ≥ 1 ‘good’ & ≥ 1 Gainers Keepers Losers Losers
HHs indiv. Match penst (strict)
4-5 12,634 8,947 2,395 91 1,967 337 236
5-6 14,143 9,560 2,672 81 2,239 352 268
6-7 14,380 9,282 2,524 94 2,097 333 254
7-8 13,554 8,887 2,385 87 1,973 325 242
8-9 13,702 8,906 2,366 91 1,990 285 220
Total 68,413 45,582 12,342 444 10,266 1,632 1,220
Notes:
1. Sample restricted to African headed households with only 1 dwelling
per property, in both periods.
2. ‘Strict’ definition of a Loser household:
(# residents aged ≥ ((pension-age)+2)) at Timet > (# residents aged ≥ pension-age) at Timet+1
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Table 2.3: Selection (on observables): Means in Wavet
Col I II III IV V VI
Variable X-sect Panel Diff Full X- Panel - Diff
only (II-I) Section Reweighted (V-IV)
urban 0.372 0.379 0.007 0.376 0.373 -0.003
hhsize 4.915 5.647 0.732*** 5.350 5.401 0.051
# kids young (0-7) 0.738 0.886 0.148*** 0.826 0.830 0.004
# kids school (8-15) 0.971 1.186 0.215*** 1.099 1.120 0.021
# youth (16 - 20) 0.525 0.633 0.108*** 0.589 0.599 0.010
# young adults (21 - 35) 0.910 1.076 0.166*** 1.009 1.022 0.014
# middle adults (36 - 50) 0.419 0.480 0.062*** 0.455 0.456 0.000
# older adults (51 - pension age) 0.193 0.208 0.014** 0.202 0.202 0.000
# pension aged 1.177 1.197 0.020*** 1.189 1.191 0.002
# young adults work 0.190 0.213 0.023*** 0.203 0.205 0.001
# middle adults work 0.137 0.152 0.015*** 0.146 0.144 -0.002
# older adults work 0.052 0.056 0.004 0.055 0.056 0.001
# young adults in LF (broad) 0.741 0.885 0.144*** 0.827 0.841 0.014
# middle adults in LF (broad) 0.321 0.367 0.045*** 0.348 0.347 -0.001
# older adults in LF (broad) 0.088 0.094 0.006 0.092 0.092 0.000
# young adults in LF (narrow) 0.517 0.602 0.085*** 0.567 0.575 0.007
# middle adults (narrow) 0.244 0.278 0.033*** 0.264 0.263 -0.001
# older adults (narrow) 0.070 0.074 0.005 0.072 0.073 0.000
Notes:
1. Sample is all African headed households, with a single dwelling on the property,
with no member’s age missing, and at least one ‘pensioner’ in the household
2. Data corresponds to Wavet - i.e. from Waves 4 - 8
3. Means are unweighted, except in column V
4. The ‘single dwelling’ requirement excludes 6.25% of the sample,
when all the other constraints are satisfied
5. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, ** denotes the same at the 1% level
6. The pension age is 60 or above for women, and 65 or above for men
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics in Wavet (Mean, and ratio of means)
Composition # Work # in LF (broad) # in LF (nar)
number proportion proportion proportion
Keep Lose Keep Lose Keep Lose Keep Lose
HH size 5.36 6.39
kids young 0.86 0.97
kids school 1.11 1.32
youth 0.59 0.77 0.035 0.023 0.223 0.240 0.112 0.103
young adults 1.02 1.20 0.193 0.185 0.822 0.816 0.551 0.548
young adult:F 0.55 0.64 0.171 0.155 0.812 0.794 0.507 0.501
young adult:M 0.47 0.56 0.219 0.219 0.834 0.842 0.603 0.601
mid-aged adults 0.46 0.58 0.312 0.326 0.764 0.779 0.578 0.588
mid-aged adult:F 0.25 0.35 0.326 0.291 0.766 0.715 0.570 0.520
mid-aged adult:M 0.21 0.23 0.296 0.378 0.761 0.871 0.588 0.688
older adults 0.17 0.25 0.274 0.317 0.485 0.512 0.372 0.397
older adult:F 0.09 0.13 0.264 0.310 0.445 0.454 0.339 0.349
older adult:M 0.08 0.13 0.286 0.325 0.530 0.571 0.410 0.445
# pens age 1.17 1.33
N 10,266 1,220
Notes:
1. Means are weighted by [pweight x IPWeight]
2. The ‘proportions’ are the ratio of the mean number in a particular labor market category and
demographic group, to the mean number in that demographic group.
3. Age-groups: kids young (0-7), kids school (8-15), youth (16-20), young adults (21-35),
middle adults (36-50), older adults (51 - pension-age)
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics: Main Income Source
Distribution of Main Income Source in Household (%)
T0 T1
Keeper Loser Keeper Loser
Salaries and/or wages 15.6 26.3 15.4 31.0
Remittances 4.5 7.3 4.2 26.0
Pensions and grants 77.8 61.7 77.9 35.0
Sales of farm product 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.3
Other non-farm income 1.5 2.8 1.8 5.4
no income 0.2 1.3 0.2 1.4
Unspecified 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
N 6,054 710 4212 510
Notes:
1. The T0 data relates to observations in Panels 4-5, 6-7 and 8-9,
the T1 data relates to observations in Panels 5-6 & 7-8
2. Means are weighted by [pweight x IPWeight]
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Table 2.6: Regression Results: Composition and Activity (in # of people)
Composition # Work # in LF (broad) # in LF (nar)
Outcome variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
4 HH size -0.86 [0.079]***
4 # kids young 0.031 [0.033]
4 # kids school -0.063 [0.032]**
4 # youth -0.007 [0.026] 0.008 [0.007] -0.027 [0.020] 0.007 [0.014]
4 # young adults 0.039 [0.034] 0.056 [0.019]*** 0.04 [0.032] 0.055 [0.035]
4 # young adult:F 0.025 [0.025] 0.032 [0.013]** 0.025 [0.025] 0.031 [0.024]
4 # young adult:M 0.014 [0.025] 0.024 [0.013]* 0.015 [0.023] 0.023 [0.023]
4 # mid-adults 0.063 [0.026]** 0.05 [0.018]*** 0.01 [0.025] 0.03 [0.025]
4 # mid-adult:F 0.052 [0.019]*** 0.035 [0.011]*** 0.021 [0.018] 0.027 [0.016]
4 # mid-adult:M 0.011 [0.016] 0.015 [0.012] -0.012 [0.016] 0.003 [0.014]
4 # older adults 0.279 [0.022]*** 0.102 [0.015]*** 0.118 [0.017]*** 0.118 [0.016]***
4 # older adult:F 0.144 [0.015]*** 0.051 [0.010]*** 0.06 [0.011]*** 0.058 [0.011]***
4 # older adult:M 0.135 [0.016]*** 0.051 [0.011]*** 0.059 [0.013]*** 0.06 [0.012]***
4 # pens age -1.064 [0.007]***
Notes:
1. Robust Std. Errors, clustered at the ‘hhid’ level are reported
2. Omitted coefficients on variables included in the regression for variables:
Province dummies, wave dummies, urban dummy and no. of pensioners in the ‘Wavet’ period.
3. With the exception of the regression on household size, all the other
regressions also controlled for initial household size.
4. N = 11486 in each of the regressions
5. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level
6. Each coefficient and corresponding standard error is obtained from a separate regression.
7. Age-groups: kids young (0-7), kids school (8-15), youth (16-20), young adults (21-35),
middle adults (36-50), older adults (51 - pension-age)
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Table 2.7: Regression results: 4 Activity conditional on within group stability
Group Outcome Losing Coef. Std. Err. Mean # % pt. 4
Variable Obs in HH
Youth Work 769 0.008 [0.007] 0.540 1.5
In LF broad 769 -0.006 [0.015] 0.540 -1.1
In LF Narrow 769 0.004 [0.012] 0.540 0.7
Young Adult Work 601 0.047 [0.020]** 0.841 5.6
In LF broad 601 0.055 [0.020]*** 0.841 6.5
In LF Narrow 601 0.059 [0.030]** 0.841 7.0
Young Adult:F Work 793 0.029 [0.013]** 0.452 6.4
In LF broad 793 0.004 [0.015] 0.452 0.9
In LF Narrow 793 0.033 [0.022] 0.452 7.3
Young Adult:M Work 819 0.009 [0.012] 0.375 2.4
In LF broad 819 0.027 [0.011]** 0.375 7.2
In LF Narrow 819 0.032 [0.015]** 0.375 8.5
Middle Adult Work 800 0.03 [0.016]* 0.446 6.7
In LF broad 800 -0.021 [0.014] 0.446 -4.7
In LF Narrow 800 -0.018 [0.015] 0.446 -4.0
Middle Adult:F Work 922 0.025 [0.010]** 0.277 9.0
In LF broad 922 -0.006 [0.011] 0.277 -2.2
In LF Narrow 922 -0.002 [0.011] 0.277 -0.7
Middle Adult:M Work 985 0.014 [0.008]* 0.145 9.6
In LF broad 985 -0.005 [0.007] 0.145 -3.4
In LF Narrow 985 -0.003 [0.007] 0.145 -2.1
Older Adult Work 796 0.015 [0.010] 0.193 7.8
In LF broad 796 0.025 [0.011]** 0.193 13.0
In LF Narrow 796 0.022 [0.011]** 0.193 11.4
Older Adult:F Work 958 0.016 [0.007]** 0.110 14.5
In LF broad 958 0.016 [0.008]* 0.110 14.5
In LF Narrow 958 0.02 [0.008]** 0.110 18.1
Older Adult:M Work 995 0.007 [0.006] 0.106 6.6
In LF broad 995 0.005 [0.006] 0.106 4.7
In LF Narrow 995 0.006 [0.006] 0.106 5.7
1. Outcome variables in units of 4 in ‘(# of people’)
2. Reported coefficient corresponds to dependent variable losepen
3. Robust Std. Errors, clustered at the ‘hhid’ level are reported
4. Omitted coefficients on variables included in the regression for variables:
Province dummies, wave dummies, urban dummy, initial household size
and no. of pensioners in the Wavet period.
5. N = 10266 Keepers + # Losing Observations in each of the regressions
6. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level
7. ‘% pt. 4’ column is obtained by: 100*coefficient/(Mean # in HH)
8. The Mean # in HH contains information only from Loser HHs included in the regression,
and observations are weighted by [pweight x IPWeight]
9. Each coefficient and corresponding standard error is obtained from a separate regression.
10. Age-groups: kids young (0-7), kids school (8-15), youth (16-20), young adults (21-35),
middle adults (36-50), older adults (51 - pension-age)
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Table 2.8: Individual level regressions for changes in Labor Market status
Dependent variable
Group N 4 work 4 in LF br 4 in LF nar
youth 4391 0.015 -0.057 0.005
[0.011] [0.026]** [0.021]
young adults 6856 0.002 -0.027 -0.035
[0.021] [0.019] [0.027]
young adult: F 3765 -0.012 -0.021 -0.074
[0.027] [0.029] [0.036]**
young adult: M 3091 0.016 -0.032 0.007
[0.030] [0.024] [0.035]
mid-aged adults 3316 0.088 0.016 0.039
[0.030]*** [0.031] [0.031]
mid-aged adult: F 1850 0.093 0.025 0.025
[0.037]** [0.042] [0.043]
mid-aged adult: M 1466 0.081 0.000 0.058
[0.041]** [0.041] [0.040]
older adults 1537 0.103 0.111 0.107
[0.043]** [0.043]** [0.044]**
older adult: F 856 0.103 0.122 0.131
[0.059]* [0.062]** [0.059]**
older adult: M 681 0.103 0.106 0.083
[0.053]* [0.055]* [0.059]
Notes:
1. Outcome variables in units of 4 in labor market status, values of -1, 0 & 1 in data.
2. Reported coefficient corresponds to dependent variable losepen
3. Robust Std. Errors, clustered at the ‘hhid’ level are reported
4. Omitted coefficients on variables included in the regression for variables:
Province dummies, wave dummies, urban dummy and no. of pensioners in the Wavet period.
5. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level
6. Observations are weighted by [pweight x IPWeight]
7. Each coefficient and corresponding standard error is obtained from a separate regression.
8. Age-groups: youth (16-20), young adults (21-35), middle adults (36-50), older adults (51 - pension-age)
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Table 2.9: Regression results using ‘Deaths1’ for identification: Composition and Activity (in
number of people)
Composition # Work # in LF (broad) # in LF (nar)
Outcome variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
4 HH size -0.91 [0.261]***
4 # kids young -0.017 [0.123]
4 # kids school -0.02 [0.093]
4 # youth 0.003 [0.119] -0.007 [0.015] -0.026 [0.071] -0.109 [0.075]
4 # young adults -0.047 [0.150] 0.073 [0.089] -0.168 [0.148] 0.001 [0.153]
4 # young adult:F 0.114 [0.093] 0.112 [0.069] -0.033 [0.085] 0.161 [0.093]*
4 # young adult:M -0.161 [0.112] -0.04 [0.065] -0.135 [0.105] -0.16 [0.108]
4 # mid-adults 0.132 [0.108] 0.145 [0.111] 0.2 [0.114]* 0.153 [0.113]
4 # mid-adult:F 0.066 [0.081] 0.058 [0.056] 0.089 [0.082] 0.073 [0.088]
4 # mid-adult:M 0.065 [0.078] 0.087 [0.064] 0.111 [0.063]* 0.08 [0.080]
4 # older adults 0.151 [0.066]** 0.065 [0.037]* 0.094 [0.043]** 0.089 [0.044]**
4 # older adult:F 0.092 [0.063] 0.037 [0.028] 0.036 [0.028] 0.044 [0.031]
4 # older adult:M 0.058 [0.036] 0.028 [0.025] 0.058 [0.033]* 0.045 [0.031]
4 # pens age -1 [0.000]***
Notes:
1. Death 1 is obtained from the Deaths file in wave 5
2. Robust Std. Errors, clustered at the ‘hhid’ level are reported
3. Omitted coefficients on variables included in the regression for variables:
Province dummies, wave dummies, urban dummy and no. of pensioners in the ‘Wavet’ period.
4. With the exception of the regression on household size, all the other
regressions also controlled for initial household size.
5. N = 10313 in each of the regressions, 47 Losers, 10266 Keeper
6. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level
7. Each coefficient and corresponding standard error is obtained from a separate regression.
8. Age-groups: kids young (0-7), kids school (8-15), youth (16-20), young adults (21-35),
middle adults (36-50), older adults (51 - pension-age)
Table 2.10: Regression results using ‘Deaths2’ for identification: Composition and Activity (in
number of people)
Composition # Work # in LF (broad) # in LF (nar)
Outcome variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
4 HH size -0.651 [0.233]***
4 # kids young 0.016 [0.067]
4 # kids school 0.048 [0.107]
4 # youth 0.134 [0.094] 0.041 [0.038] 0.026 [0.048] 0.038 [0.075]
4 # young adults -0.012 [0.108] 0.097 [0.096] 0.014 [0.124] -0.052 [0.105]
4 # young adult:F -0.044 [0.077] 0.081 [0.066] 0.03 [0.074] -0.058 [0.067]
4 # young adult:M 0.032 [0.075] 0.016 [0.056] -0.016 [0.093] 0.007 [0.085]
4 # mid-adults 0.12 [0.098] 0.069 [0.069] 0.088 [0.087] 0.058 [0.088]
4 # mid-adult:F 0.114 [0.088] 0.103 [0.063] 0.121 [0.070]* 0.104 [0.079]
4 # mid-adult:M 0.005 [0.058] -0.034 [0.026] -0.033 [0.035] -0.046 [0.050]
4 # older adults 0.077 [0.041]* 0.022 [0.024] 0.025 [0.024] 0.078 [0.036]**
4 # older adult:F 0.025 [0.026] 0.001 [0.005] 0.001 [0.005] 0.04 [0.024]*
4 # older adult:M 0.052 [0.032] 0.021 [0.023] 0.024 [0.023] 0.038 [0.027]
4 # pens age -1.026 [0.019]***
Notes:
1. Death2 is obtained using the ‘spouse - widow’ algorithm described in the paper
2. The sample in death2 conditions on marital status and co-residency, so it is not entirely comparable
to the other two samples.
3. Robust Std. Errors, clustered at the ‘hhid’ level are reported
4. Omitted coefficients on variables included in the regression for variables:
Province dummies, wave dummies, urban dummy and no. of pensioners in the ‘Wavet’ period.
5. With the exception of the regression on household size, all the other
regressions also controlled for initial household size .
6. N = 10326 in each of the regressions, 60 Losers, 10266 Keepers
7. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level
8. Each coefficient and corresponding standard error is obtained from a separate regression.
9. Age-groups: kids young (0-7), kids school (8-15), youth (16-20), young adults (21-35),
middle adults (36-50), older adults (51 - pension-age)
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Table 2.11: Individual level regressions for changes in Labor Market status: Rural KwaZulu
Natal
Dependent variable
Group N 4 work 4 in LF br 4 in LF nar
youth 636 0.034 -0.031 -0.007
[0.018]* [0.062] [0.049]
young adults 840 0.042 -0.008 -0.075
[0.049] [0.048] [0.064]
young adult: F 471 0.036 0.029 -0.166
[0.068] [0.088] [0.080]**
young adult: M 369 0.043 -0.049 0.003
[0.074] [0.037] [0.090]
mid-aged adults 342 0.028 -0.099 -0.039
[0.059] [0.079] [0.066]
mid-aged adult: F 205 0.031 -0.142 -0.086
[0.068] [0.097] [0.090]
mid-aged adult: M 137 -0.032 -0.073 0.004
[0.109] [0.138] [0.071]
older adults 170 0.19 0.145 0.17
[0.093]** [0.100] [0.110]
older adult: F 86 0.283 0.247 0.304
[0.115]** [0.126]* [0.117]**
older adult: M 84 0.021 -0.059 -0.053
[0.132] [0.126] [0.154]
1. Outcome variables in units of 4 in labor market status, values of -1, 0 & 1 in data.
2. Reported coefficient corresponds to dependent variable losepen
3. Robust Std. Errors, clustered at the ‘hhid’ level are reported
4. Omitted coefficients on variables included in the regression for variables:
Wave dummies and no. of pensioners in the Wavet period.
5. * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level
6. Observations are weighted by [pweight x IPWeight]
7. Each coefficient and corresponding standard error is obtained from a separate regression.




Figure 2.1: Age Heaping in the LFS Data
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Estimating the responsiveness of college applications to the
likelihood of acceptance and financial assistance: Evidence from
Texas
3.1 Introduction
This paper addresses the question: To what extent does the South African Old Age
Pension (OAP) reduce the labor supply of the elderly? The pension is large relative to the
earning capacity of many elderly people. Recipiency rates are high and all South Africans
could potentially receive it. However, the existence of a means test excludes wealthier
people from receiving the pension. Our identification is obtained using the discontinuity in
age that determines eligibility for receiving the pension. The paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 provides an introduction to the current state pension, its history in brief, and
the rules that govern the scheme. Section 3 provides a review of some of the literature that
has already been written about the pension. Section 4 presents a simple theoretical model
that underlies our a priori expectations for labor supply. Section 5 describes the data used
to answer the research question. Section 6 discusses the empirical strategy and presents
results and interpretation of our analysis. Section 7 discusses caveats to the results and
interpretation, and provides some further evidence and robustness checks in response to
these caveats. Section 8 concludes.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 History of the old age pension
The South African Old Age Pension involves a relatively large cash transfer to elderly
South Africans. The pension is subject to both a means test and an assets test. In
terms of the statute, the pension is decreased in value over some interval as other non-
pension income increases 1, until it is reduced to zero. What makes it almost unique in
the developing world is its value and coverage, both of which are relatively high.2
Lund (1993) provides an introduction to the OAP as we see it today. The author
documents a number of historical characteristics of the pension, up to the early 1990’s. A
similar documentation of the evolution of the scheme is provided by van der Berg (1997).
Case and Deaton (1998) provide a detailed description of the OAP system at the time just
prior to the first democratic elections in 1994. They note that in the 1993 dataset that
they used, the value of the pension was“twice the median household’s per capita income”
of African households. They also note that the pension value was not, in practice, reduced
as other income increased. In fact, it seemed more likely that the means test was applied
in a binary fashion, i.e. the means test precluded some people from receiving the pension,
but those who did receive it tended to receive the maximal value.3
At present, the structure of the pension remains largely unchanged from 1993. The
value has periodically been adjusted in response to inflation, and in 2000/2001 it stood at
R540 per month, or R6480 per annum.
3.2.2 Pension Rules
Information gathered from the government’s Dept. of Social Welfare website 4 indicates
that for someone to be eligible to receive the old age pension, they need to satisfy the
following criteria:
1However, empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case in practice. This is discussed later in the section.
2See Case and Deaton (1998) for details.
3The value of the pension was 370 rand in 1993. From April 2005, this value will be R780 per month, as per the national
budget.
4http://www.welfare.gov.za. Information obtained from the document“Social Assistance Procedural Manual 2003”
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• They must be resident South African citizens
• They must be 60 years or older if female, 65 years or older if male
• Their income must not exceed R16 920 if single, or R31 320 (jointly) if married
• Their assets must not exceed R252 000 if single, or R504 000 (jointly) if married.5
If a person is eligible to receive the social grant, the value of the grant is to be calculated
as follows:
Grant = 1.5 x [Maximum Grant per Annum] - 0.5*[Annual Net Income] if single;
or Grant = 1.5 x [Maximum Grant per Annum] - 0.5*[Total Annual Net Income of Appli-
cant and Spouse/2] if married.
The maximum annual grant value in 2003 was R8400.6 Thus, as per the formula for cal-
culating the value of the grant, there is some low level of income that does not affect the
value of one’s pension, beyond which there is effectively a 50% tax rate on other income.
This taxation is maintained until no pension is provided. 7
Following Case and Deaton (1998), we check whether the pension value is de facto
adjusted in relation to other income using data from the IES 2000.8 We ran regressions to
test whether the pension value is correlated with other income, conditional on the pension
value being strictly positive.9 We also test whether the probability of receiving a pension
is decreasing in other income. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that other
income is relevant only in determining whether a person receives a pension or not, but
not relevant in determining the value received. Conditional on receiving some pension, the
value of the pension tends to be the maximal value. It is also worth noting that a vast
majority of respondents who are pension age-eligible would probably be able to continue
working and satisfy the means test. In the IES 2000, more than 85% of African women
5The value of a personal home is excluded from the ‘asset’ criterion.
6This paper was written in the SA fiscal year 2003/2004, so some of the values are outdated. However, the important
salient features, such as the means test and the age threshold, remain in place.
7Note, however, that the amount of other income that would drive the pension value to zero is R21 000 per annum,
considerably more than the income threshold of R16 920.
8We discuss the data in detail in Section 3.
9Since this is not crucial to our research, we have not included these regression results. Nor have we corrected for the
‘joint’ means test as applied to couples.
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aged 55 - 59 who report positive non-pension income, earned less than the income threshold
of R16 920 per annum. The corresponding figure for African men aged 60 - 64 is 78%. The
proportion that could work and receive the pension is likely to be even higher for those who
are pension age eligible, as they have less education on average. For poorer households, it
may thus be desirable for the elderly to continue working even as they start to receive the
pension.
3.3 Literature Review
As stated previously, the OAP is unique in the developing world due to its coverage
and value. This uniqueness has attracted the attention of several economists.
One of the first mainstream economics paper published on the OAP was by Case and
Deaton (1998). The authors analyze the redistributive consequences of the OAP, as well as
the expenditure patterns of households that receive the pension using the 1993 SALDRU
dataset. They find that the OAP is an effective transfer to the poor and poverty stricken
in general. Furthermore, the prevalence of three-generation households, as well as ‘skip
generation’ 10 households, results in the pension potentially benefiting children as well. In
particular, it disproportionately reaches children in poverty.
Various authors have also analyzed other dimensions of household behavior in response
to the pension. Some have looked at whether the OAP impacts on the health of recipients
or their household members. Duflo (2000) finds a discontinuous increase in children’s
height for age for children living with pension eligible persons. This increase is significant
for female children, and is realized on average only when the pension recipient is a woman.
Duflo (2003) reports similar evidence that the pension is shared between members of the
household. Moreover, the sharing of recipients’ cash from pensions is differentiated by
gender.
In similar vein, others have asked the question; ‘How do other members of the household
respond when a member becomes pension eligible?’ Bertrand et al (2003) find that having
10Households with grandparents and grandchildren but no parents.
45
a pension eligible person in the household has a statistically significant and negative impact
on the labor supply of prime aged individuals11 in the sample. Edmonds (2003) considers
the impact of the OAP on child labor supply and schooling attendance. He finds that when
a household member who is male12 becomes pension eligible, there is a sizable decline in
child labor, coupled with an increase in schooling attendance and attainment.
Jensen (2003) questions whether household disposable income increases by the full value
of the pension. He estimates that crowding out of remittances by pensions is large and
significant. On average, every rand of pension income received by the elderly is met with
a 0.25 to 0.30 rand decrease in remittances received from the pensioner’s children. This
results in an over-estimation of the poverty alleviation achieved by the pension. Jensen
also investigates the effects of the OAP on household labor supply. He finds no evidence
that the pension induced large levels of labor force withdrawal for the household on aver-
age. However, he does find a small, though not statistically significant decrease in other
household income when a pension is received.
Most recently, Edmonds et al (2005) find that household composition itself is affected
by someone becoming pension age-eligible. They find a decrease in the number of prime
working-age women, and an increase in the number of children younger than five and young
women of childbearing age.
By and large, however, most authors have ignored the potential effects on the labor
supply of the actual recipients, namely the elderly. Case and Deaton (1998), and Alderman
(1999) mention the disincentives involved in a means tested cash transfer program, but
also cite high levels of unemployment as a mitigating factor.
While it certainly is possible that the impact on the labor supply of the elderly is
negligible, this cannot be assumed a priori. We shall add to the existing literature by
rigorously investigating whether the OAP has significant labor supply effects for the elderly
or not. Moreover, this informs us about the sensitivity of retirement behaviour with
11Prime aged individuals are defined as individuals between 16 and 50 years of age in their study.
12As consistent with other papers, there is a gender differential in the impact of the pension.
46
respect to income. It also has potential implications for labor supply effects of non-elderly
recipients in response to other welfare related transfers, such as the Child Support Grant.
3.4 Theoretical Framework
One can think of the impact on labor supply (Ls) within the framework of a static model
of a consumer optimizing over (X, l) where X is the consumer’s bundle of consumption
goods and l is the consumer’s consumption of leisure. Leisure is assumed to be a normal
good. The consumption of leisure has an impact not only on utility directly via consump-
tion, but also indirectly via its impact on the budget set. We assume that the consumer
needs to decide how many hours of labor to supply for a given wage rate, where h = hours
= K − l. In this case K is the endowment of possible work hours a person has.13 We also
make the standard assumptions that utility is twice differentiable and strictly concave in
all of its arguments.
The consumer’s problem then, is to:
max
(X,l)
U(X, l) s.t. p.X ≤ w.(K − l) + Y + P (age, Y, l)
where p is a price vector corresponding to the set of consumption goods, w is the consumer’s
wage rate, Y is the consumer’s non - labor, non-pension income and P is the consumer’s
pension income, if any. Pension income is a function of age and other income as described
previously.
In this simple static model, it is straightforward to show that an exogenous increase in
P , ceteris paribus, would lead to an increase in consumption of all goods including l (or
equivalently, a decrease in h.) However, this expectation of a decrease in h applies only to
that subset of the population who were willing to supply positive amounts of labor prior
to the hypothetical increase in P .
In addition to the income effect, the OAP provides incentives to reduce earned income
via the means test. Whether the pension value is reduced in response to other income or
13An upper limit on this would be 24 hours per day, although this is clearly unreasonable.
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not remains uncertain. However, if the rules are strictly enforced, then the reduction in
pension value provides further incentives for people to reduce their Ls when they become
eligible to receive the pension. Put together, the income effect of the pension is to consume
more leisure, and the means test (as well as the potential implicit tax on earned income)
also encourages the consumer to substitute away from labor towards leisure.
Figure 3.1 depicts the movement of the budget set for a consumer just before and
just after they become pension age-eligible.14 ‘Diagram a)’ represents the case where the
pension value is gradually adjusted to zero as other income increases, while ‘Diagram b)’
represents the case where the income test is used to determine whether a person receives
any pension or not, and everyone who receives a pension receives the maximal value of
the pension. As stated previously, regardless of which of these two models is more correct,
the implication of both of them is for labor supply to (weakly) decrease when a person
becomes pension age-eligible.
Thus, a priori, we expect that becoming pension age-eligible would cause people to
stop working or reduce their hours worked, which is a testable hypothesis. Note that for
people with high levels of non-pension income, or for people with sufficiently high wage
rates, the pension is unlikely to have any effect since these people are unlikely to satisfy
the means test.15 That said, our analysis does measure the average effect of the pension
on the population.
3.5 Data
For the core section of this paper, we use data contained in the South African Labor
Force Surveys (LFS). These are nationally representative household level surveys conducted
biannually by Statistics South Africa. The sampling methodology involves a stratified
clustered design.
We pooled two waves of the LFS data, namely LFS 2000:2 and LFS 2001:2, which
14The solid line is their original budget line, and the dashed line shows how the original budget line shifts outwards upon
reaching the pension eligible age.
15It is probably more correct to say that the incentive to reduce their earned income in order to receive the pension is too
weak, and they prefer to forego the pension.
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were conducted in September 2000 and September 2001 respectively. We treat the data
from the two waves as information coming from a single survey.16 The advantage of doing
so is that we have more data and therefore, are likely to get better and more accurate
estimates.17 The data contained in the LFS datasets includes demographic information,
current employment status and related information about respondents. This focus makes
these surveys ideal for analyzing labor force participation.
We restrict our attention to the sub-sample of elderly Africans. Africans are the majority
population group in the country18, and are disproportionately likely to be receiving the
OAP.19 We define elderly as being 50 years old or greater. We thus exclude all persons
aged below 50, and also exclude all persons aged 75 or older, as there is very little variation
in their labor force participation behavior. After cleaning the data as mentioned above,
we have a sample of 18951 observations. Of these, 7774 are men and 11177 are women.
Mean pension recipiency rates are shown in Fig. 3.2.
It is reassuring to observe that self-reported recipiency rates are low for women younger
than 60 and men younger than 65, and to observe the sharp rise in recipiency rates there-
after, as this is a crucial requirement for the interpretation of our results to be valid. Fig.
3.3 shows the mean years of education, by gender, for each age group in the data. This is
in general a poorly educated subpopulation, with an average education level not exceeding
the primary school level. On average, older cohorts are less educated than younger ones,
and women are less educated than men.
In addition to the LFS data, we use the Income and Expenditure Survey 2000 (IES
2000), which is the most recent IES released by Statistics South Africa. This survey has a
cross-sectional design and is conducted every five years. It contains detailed information on
16However, we do identify the clusters separately. This is because we are not certain that the same cluster number in
different waves represent the same districts.
17A completely new sample was drawn starting with LFS 2001:2, so there are no repeat observations in the two pooled
datasets. We also have no reason to believe that there were significant changes in labor force participation rates during this
time period.
1872% of respondents aged 50 - 74 were African in our dataset, and 79% of the population was African in 2001. (Source:
Census 2001, Stats SA)
19Approximately 80% of age-eligible Africans report receiving the pension as compared to 30% of age-eligible Whites in
LFS 2000:2.
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income and expenditure. We use this data for additional analysis relating to our research
that contains an income component. Another reason to do the analysis using data from
this time period is that LFS 2000:2 coincides with the IES 2000, which allows us to combine
information from both datasets for some of our investigation.
3.6 Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate the average effects of the pension, we analyze various dimensions
of labor supply as well as type of job and hours worked. The identifying assumptions
involve the discontinuity in age-eligibility, and that people who are almost but not quite
age-eligible are not ‘too different’ from those who have ‘just become’ age eligible for the
pension. Thus, for example, we assume that 59 year old African women are not significantly
different from 60 year old women in any material respects except for the eligibility of the
60 year old women to receive the pension.
3.6.1 Labor supply analysis
We use five different measures related to labor supply. All of these are indicator variables
and are constructed as follows:
• ‘works’: =1 if in the past seven days the person was engaged in paid work, or unpaid
work in a family business, or employed as a domestic worker, or was self employed,
or worked on a family owned plot of land or has a job but was temporarily absent; =
0 otherwise.
• ‘works2’: which is the same as ’works’ except that it equals 0 if the only working
activity the person engaged in was on a family owned plot of land.
• ‘LFP broad’: (labor force participation: broad definition) =1 if the person ‘works’ or
if the person is ‘willing to accept a reasonable offer’; =0 otherwise.
• ‘retired’: =1 if a person is not ’working’, and the reason they are not working is that
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they are either ’retired’ or ’too young or too old to work’ 20 ; =0 otherwise.
• ‘accept’: is a variable only generated for those not currently working. ‘accept’=1 if
the person is ‘willing to accept a reasonable offer’; =0 if not; and is undefined for
those currently ‘working’.
We then fit probit models to these binary variables.21 Our set of covariates is simply:
(age− 50), (age− 50)2, years of education, and a dummy variable to indicate pension age-
eligibility. We also interact the pension age-eligibility dummy with all the other covariates
in the regression22, and take into account the complex sampling framework. Since the
relevant age thresholds differ for men and women, we estimate these probits separately by
gender. Education is used primarily as a ‘control’ variable, which we comment on more in
a later section.
We predict the probability of a particular outcome for each individual and find the
mean probability for each age. We also ‘project’ the probability for those exactly at
the age threshold, by predicting their probability while ignoring the coefficients on the
dummy and dummy-interacted variables. We then calculate the mean of these projected
probabilities and interpret the difference between the ‘predicted’ and ‘projected’ means,
evaluated at the relevant age, as the average effect on the outcome variable due to the
pension potentially becoming available at this age.
For example, suppose our dependent variable is retired and our subsample is African
women, aged 50 to 74. Our specification is equivalent to estimating two separate regres-
sions. The first is for the women aged 50 to 59. We use these coefficients to then project the
probability of being retired for the women aged 60 in our relevant sample23, and calculate
the mean of the projected probability of being retired. This is effectively an extrapolation
of the trend for the women aged 50 to 59, conditional on education. We interpret this as
20Since we have restricted the sample to those aged 50 - 74, we expect that this means that they are ‘too old to work’
rather than ‘too young to work’.
21For a discussion on binary dependent variables, see Greene, WH , Econometric Analysis, Ch 19.
22Note that this is equivalent to estimating the same model separately on either side of the pension age-eligibility threshold.
23‘Project’ in this instance is simply an out of estimation sample prediction.
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the counterfactual retirement rate if women aged 60 behaved identically to the younger
women, except for the fact that they are simply a year older.
The second regression involves fitting the identical specification to the data for women
aged 60 to 74. Using this second set of coefficients, we again predict the probability of
retirement, and calculate the mean of the predicted probability for each age. Our estimate
of the treatment effect is then the difference between the projected mean and the predicted
mean, evaluated for the women who report being aged exactly 60.
In order to measure the accuracy of our estimates of the treatment effect, we bootstrap
the results over 1000 replications for each regression. In performing the bootstrap, we
explicitly replicate the stratification that was used to draw the original sample. We also
test for the joint significance of the dummy and dummy-interacted variables by means of
adjusted Wald tests.
3.6.2 Labor supply analysis: Results
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the regression results for men and women respectively. The
individual coefficients relating to the dummy and dummy interacted variables are not
always significant.24
However, the results are most elegantly presented graphically. Figures 3.4a - 3.4e depict
the average predicted probability of the relevant measure being equal to one for African
males. Figures 3.5a - 3.5e depict the average predicted probability of the relevant measure
being equal to one for African females. The square on the vertical line through the pen-
sion age threshold represents the projected trend from our regression, after controlling for
education. Graphically, the difference between the ‘square’ and the ‘dot’ on the vertical
line represents our estimate of the impact of the OAP.
We reject the hypothesis that the dummy and dummy-interacted coefficients are simul-
taneously equal to zero in all but one of our regressions. We reject these at any reasonable
level of significance. The only regression where we cannot claim joint significance of the
24In fact, they are never individually significant for men.
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dummy and dummy interacted variables at the 5% conventional level, but can still claim
it at the 10% level, is the regression relating to males with dependent variable accept.
Insofar as general statements can be made about individual covariates, we observe the
following: For men, the (age − 50)2 coefficient is usually significant, while it is not so for
women. ‘Years of education’ has a clearly significant effect on labor force participation for
both genders. As expected, an increase in education is associated with an increase in the
probability of working or being in the labor force25, and a decrease in the probability of
being retired for any given age.
For women the coefficient on the dummy variable is sometimes significant, but is of
the ‘wrong’ sign in these cases. However, after accounting for the significant and negative
coefficients corresponding to the dummy interacted with (age − 50), we observe a net
negative marginal effect from the set of dummy and dummy interacted variables.
That said, our stated objective was to measure the impact of becoming pension age-
eligible, and not only to identify whether labor force behavior is affected by the pension
or not. Table 3.3 presents the difference in the average predicted probabilities generated
as described above. We also present our bootstrapped mean, 5th centile, 95th centile and
standard deviation of the difference.
In general, our estimates of the difference are both large and significant. From Table
3.3, for males: we observe that becoming pension-age eligible coincides with a drop of
7.6% points in the probability of working and a drop of 9.5% points in the probability
of working if we exclude subsistence farming. This larger drop for the latter is consistent
with a migratory labor supply system, whereby workers leave their formal employment and
return to homesteads in rural areas where they are likely to engage in some agricultural
activities . We also see that broadly defined labor force participation drops by 8.4% points
and the proportion retired increases by 9.3% points. The difference in willingness to accept
is the smallest at 3.4% points.
25This is expected because better educated people have higher wages on average and therefore have a higher opportunity
cost of leisure. We assume away the possibility of a backward bending labor supply function for this relatively poor population.
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For women, turning 60 coincides with a drop in the average probability of working of
5.7% points. This drop rises to 8.8% points if we exclude family plot based agriculture.
Broadly defined labor supply drops by 12.6% points and the probability of being retired
rises by 20.6% points. The average probability of being willing to accept a job drops by
11.7% points.
This rise in the proportion of women ‘retired’ seems implausibly large in relation to all
of the other estimates. Bear in mind, however, that ‘retired’ is a combination of those not
working and those not willing to accept a job. Since both of these measures exhibit large
decreases at age 60, the effect on the retired group is bigger than the effect in either single
dimension.
Our bootstrap results reinforce our belief that becoming pension age eligible is correlated
with discrete changes in labor supply. We focus on the sign of the 5th centile of each
simulated variable except for ‘retired’, where we focus on the 95th centile. For example,
the 5th centile for the ‘works’ variables for men is 0.015 which is positive. This means
that we estimate a reduction in the proportion of males working in at least 95% of our
bootstrapped samples. With the exception of the ‘accept’ dimension for males, we conclude
that there is sufficient statistical evidence to believe that there is a significant discontinuous
reduction in labor supply in every dimension for both genders.
3.6.3 Hours Worked Analysis
The second theoretical prediction that we have is that a person’s hours worked, con-
ditional on them still working, should decrease once they become pension age-eligible. In
order to identify this effect, we analyze the reported ‘usual total hours worked’ of elderly
African people. We separate our data into two types of workers, those in ‘fixed-time’ jobs
where the employer fully determines the hours worked by the employee, and ‘flextime’ jobs,
those where the employee fully determines the hours worked.26 The type of job accepted
26The question reads, “Can ‘respondent’ decide on the number of hours per week during which he/she works?” (Q4.22).
We define flextime=1 if option 1 was selected and flextime=0 if option 3 was selected.
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is almost surely an endogenous choice of the worker27, and we examine the possibility
that workers may switch from fixed-time employment towards flextime employment upon
becoming pension age-eligible.
We test by means of probit regressions whether being pension age-eligible coincides
with a significant increase in the probability of being in a flextime job relative to being
in a fixed-time job. As before, this is done separately by gender. We also estimate the
difference in hours worked for workers in each type of job for the group of people who
are pension age-eligible, and compare this to the difference for those who are not pension
age-eligible.
3.6.4 Hours Worked Analysis: Results
Fig. 3.6 depicts the ratio of people in flextime relative to fixed-time employment by
gender. This ratio goes above one for the first time, and remains above one thereafter28, at
exactly the gender-specific age at which people first become pension age-eligible.29 These
ratios both seem relatively stable for ages below the relevant age threshold, and rises very
sharply for men between the ages of 64 and 66, and women between the ages of 59 and 61.
Table 3.4 reports the results of probit estimates under slightly different assumptions
about the data, with flextime as our dependent variable. In all cases, we find that
conditional on being employed, being in the older group of workers is coincident with a
greater probability of being in flextime employment. From the marginal effects column, we
observe that this probability is estimated to be 14.7% points for men and 13.9 % points for
women. The coefficient on the dummy variable is significant at the 5% level for both men
and women. This is true regardless of whether we adjust for the complex sample design
or not.
Table 3.5 reports the results of the male and female regressions of hours worked30 on age,
27Subject to the availability of such jobs to that worker.
28We cannot distinguish whether this is only due to differential attrition from the two types of jobs or whether people
switch types of jobs at these ages.
29The sharp drop in the ratio for women aged 65 is possibly due to age heaping, although there is no way to test this. The
proportion of this sample who remain employed is also very small.
30We disregarded observations where reported hours worked was greater than 100. We believe this to be a plausible cut
off point given that the mean and modal hours worked in the data are between 40 and 50 hours per week. Moreover, we only
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type of job, a dummy for pension age-eligibility and an interaction term for the dummy
and ‘type of job’ variables. If people do want to consume more leisure upon receiving the
pension, we would expect there to be a drop in the usual hours worked for people who
are pension age-eligible, in addition to a possible general trend effect of working less as
one gets older. We expect that this drop would be more pronounced for those in flextime
positions relative to those in fixed-time jobs.
Interpreting the coefficient estimates as averages, we see that men in a flextime posi-
tions work 7.74 fewer hours per week on average. Those who are over 65 years old and
in a flextime position work an additional 4.86 fewer hours than their similarly aged coun-
terparts. This latter difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. For women, a
similar pattern is observed. Women in flextime positions work 6.32 fewer hours per week
on average. Amongst those who are pension age-eligible, this difference increases by an
additional 5.57 hours . This latter difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
These results are all the more compelling given that we find no statistically significant
difference in the average hours worked between those in fixed-time jobs on either side of
the relevant age thresholds.
3.7 Caveats and Robustness Checks
In this section we discuss some of the potential reasons to doubt our results. We address
them to the extent possible, and discuss their impact in the cases where we cannot.
3.7.1 Age Heaping
Our first caveat relates to the “age-heaping” phenomenon. By this, we refer to the
tendency of people to round their reported age to the nearest multiple of ten or possibly
five. Fig. 3.7 shows the age profile for men and women in our sample. We note that the
heaping is more acute for women than for men. The heaping is problematic for us since
our identification is achieved off of the discontinuity in age-eligibility at exactly the ages
disregard 22 out of 7089 observations, and hence this is unlikely to substantively affect our results.
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at which the heaping occurs. Moreover, it is not clear what the effect of the heaping is on
our estimates.31 We also have no way to verify a person’s true age.
We do assume, however, that education is negatively correlated with the heaping phe-
nomenon.32 We thus hope that by controlling for education in our regressions we are also,
at least in part, controlling for some of the non-random effects of heaping.
3.7.2 Empirical Specification
One major reason to be suspicious of our results lies in the possibility that the estimated
‘discontinuity’ at the relevant ages is simply a product of trends for people of those ages. In
order to check whether this is the case, we estimate the labor supply regressions discussed
previously, but change the age at which the dummy variable equals one. We thus estimated
the difference for men assuming that the discontinuity occurred at ages 63, 64, 66 and 67,
and compared these estimates to the results discuss previously.33 For women we perform
a similar adjustment and estimate the difference assuming that the discontinuity occurs at
ages 58, 59, 61 and 62.
Figures 3.8a - 3.8e) provide the results in graphic form for male labor force participation.
Fig. 3.9a - 3.9e) show the corresponding graphs for female labor force participation. By
looking at the graphs and the size of the estimated difference for the various ages, we
conclude that if there is a discontinuous change in labor supply at these ages, it seems
most likely that it occurs for men at age 65 and for women at age 60.34 This is because
the largest estimated difference in the expected direction occurs at these particular ages.
31At a stretch, one could assume an equal probability of heaping for people close to a particular age, say 60. In this case,
more people below sixty would erroneously report their age as 60 than the number of people heaping to 60 whose true ages
are above sixty, due to the shape of the population pyramid. One could make the conjecture that women below 60 are more
likely, on average, to be in the labor force than women above 60. In this specific case we would underestimate the magnitude
of the true discontinuity for women at age 60.
32This seems more plausible when one observes the ‘dip’ in average years of education at the ages of 60 for women and 65
for men. See Figure 3.3).
33We ran separate regressions for each different age tested.
34We have also generated the corresponding graphs for the other measures of labor supply. The general pattern is consistent
with the belief that discontinuities occur for men at age 65 and for women at age 60.
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3.7.3 Consumption Smoothing
The third critique of our findings arises when we change from our static theoretical
framework into a dynamic rational expectations environment. Applying the permanent
income hypothesis35, people should optimally ‘smooth’ their consumption of all goods,
leisure included, in response to the anticipated receipt of the pension.36
To the extent that such smoothing occurs, the pension will induce a decrease in labor
force participation prior to the pensionable age. This will bias our estimates downward,
and our estimates are thus likely to be lower bounds of the effects of the pension.
3.7.4 Mandatory Retirement
A particularly problematic issue is the one of mandatory retirement, which is legal in
South Africa. There is no way to control for the potential problem that people could
involuntarily lose their jobs. Moreover, the conventional retirement ages for firms are 60
or 65.37 However, this does not fully explain the estimated changes in all of our many
dimensions of labor supply. Self-reported retirement rates increase for both genders, and
the willingness to accept employment decreases significantly for women at the 5% level
and for men at the 10% level. These are unlikely to be consistent with an increase in
involuntary unemployment.
Furthermore, the majority of men aged 60 - 64 and women aged 55 - 59 that are em-
ployed are not employed in organizations registered for VAT38, which is an indicator of
whether they are employed in the formal sector or not. It seems unlikely that people
employed in informal sector jobs would be forced into retirement by corporate rules. In
addition, very few people receive employment related pensions, which makes it less likely
that mandatory retirement is coupled with employment related retirement funds that re-
duce one’s willingness to work.
35See Friedman, M. (1957) A Theory of the Consumption Function.
36This assumes that they are not too risk averse, have faith in the government continuing to provide the pension and are
not liquidity constrained.
37Although firms may not legally discriminate by gender, which applies to retirement ages as well.
38Of the employed men aged 60 - 64, this proportion is 58% in our data. For women aged 55 - 59, the proportion is 81%.
58
Using data from the LFS 2000:2, we find that the percentage of women in the 60 -
64 year age group who receive employment related pensions was only 2.6%. For men,
the percentage aged 65 - 69 who receive employment related pension was 7.2%, which we
consider to be fairly small. In addition, this is identical to the proportion of men aged 60
- 64 who report receiving an employment related pension. Thus it seems improbable that
the employment related pension and mandatory retirement explain the discrete drops in
all of our measures of labor supply at the relevant age threshold.
3.8 Conclusion
We conclude with the finding that the income effects, and possible substitution effects,
created by the Old Age Pension do have significant effects on labor supply. We conserva-
tively estimate that the pension causes a reduction in labor supply of 8.4% points for men
and 12.6% points for women in our sample. This is equivalent to labor force withdrawal
of 1 in 12 African men at age 65, and 1 in 8 African women at age 60, and we believe that
this is a lower bound of the true effect of the pension.
The second part of our analysis shows that people are more likely to be in flextime
positions relative to fixed-time positions if they are of pension-eligible ages and continue
to work. Moreover, the difference in average hours worked between flextime and fixed-time
jobs increases for people who are pension age-eligible.
One policy implication is that the state needs to carefully consider the incentives it pro-
vides under its various welfare programs. In particular, the recently resurrected “Unem-
ployment Insurance Fund” as well as the Basic Child Grant, will also provide disincentives




Table 3.1: Regression Results for African Men
Works LFP broad Works2 Retired Accept
D 65 -1.405 -1.707 -0.973 0.075 -1.101
1.796 1.753 2.093 1.669 3.351
(age-50) 0.014 -0.024 0.011 0.066** -0.059*
0.016 0.018 0.016 0.024 0.026
D 65*(age-50) 0.074 0.087 0.026 0.125 0.029
0.191 0.186 0.223 0.177 0.359
(age− 50)2 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 0.004** -0.003
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
D 65*(age− 50)2 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.007 0.002
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.01
Years of Education 0.019** 0.028** 0.026** -0.001 0.032**
0.005 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.008
D 65*(Yrs of Educ.) -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.013 0.009
0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.018
Constant 0.246** 0.961** 0.121* -1.943** 0.186*
0.053 0.059 0.052 0.086 0.085
Observations 7624 7558 7624 7624 3832
Adjusted Wald Test for joint significance of dummy and dummy interacted coefficients
test - statistic 6.02 8.23 6.45 12.12 2
Pr(F > t-stat)|Ho is true 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.092
Standard errors in italics below the coefficient estimates
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
D 65 is a dummy, =1 if age>=65, =0 otherwise
The sample size for LFP broad differs from the other samples as some people who are not employed
respond ‘Don’t know’ to the accept question, and are excluded from this regression
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Table 3.2: Regression Results for African Women
Works LFP broad Works2 Retired Accept
D 60 1.031** 0.65 1.253** -0.994** -0.496
0.358 0.356 0.422 0.322 0.741
(age-50) -0.031 -0.051* -0.028 0.065* -0.06
0.025 0.026 0.025 0.033 0.035
D 60*(age-50) -0.166** -0.151** -0.220** 0.261** -0.03
0.053 0.053 0.061 0.053 0.106
(age− 50)2 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.001
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
D 60*(age− 50)2 0.006 0.006 0.007* -0.011** 0.002
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005
Years of Education 0.058** 0.059** 0.068** -0.042** 0.038**
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.008
D 60*(Yrs of Educ.) -0.027** -0.021** -0.015 0.016 0.011
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.013
Constant -0.223** 0.345** -0.380** -1.360** -0.322**
0.05 0.051 0.05 0.071 0.069
Observations 11038 10903 11038 11038 7577
Adjusted Wald Test for joint significance of dummy and dummy interacted coefficients
test - statistic 12.14 19.76 16.29 45.3 11.67
Pr(F > t-stat)|Ho is true 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in italics below the coefficient estimates
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
D 60 is a dummy, =1 if age>=60, =0 otherwise
The sample size for LFP broad differs from the other samples as some people who are not employed
respond ‘Don’t know’ to the accept question, and are excluded from this regression
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Table 3.3: Regression and Bootstrap Results
Regression Output Bootstrap Output of Differences
Ave Projected Ave Predicted Diff. Mean 5th % 95th % Std Dev.
Male
Works 0.343 0.267 0.076 0.075 0.015 0.14 0.038
Works2 0.286 0.192 0.095 0.094 0.038 0.151 0.034
LFP broad 0.411 0.327 0.084 0.083 0.018 0.152 0.041
Retired 0.493 0.586 -0.093 -0.094 -0.164 -0.025 0.043
Accept 0.112 0.079 0.034 0.035 -0.014 0.086 0.03
Female
Works 0.326 0.269 0.057 0.058 0.005 0.11 0.032
Works2 0.285 0.197 0.088 0.09 0.039 0.14 0.03
LFP broad 0.447 0.321 0.126 0.126 0.069 0.185 0.035
Retired 0.315 0.522 -0.206 -0.205 -0.262 -0.148 0.035
Accept 0.185 0.068 0.117 0.117 0.068 0.17 0.03
Note: All data on the ‘Accept’ variable are not to be interpreted as population proportions,
since they relate to the subpopulation of people who are not employed.
62
Table 3.4: Regression Results: Dependent Variable is ‘flextime’
Male Female
Mfx Probit Svy-Probit Mfx Probit Svy-Probit
(age− 50) 0.007 0.02 0.012 -0.004 -0.01 -0.015
0.005 0.013 0.015 0.005 0.013 0.015
(age− 50)2 0 0.001 0.002 0.001** 0.003** 0.003**
0 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.001
D 65 0.147** 0.387** 0.320*
0.054 0.138 0.158
D 60 0.139** 0.349** 0.439**
0.036 0.092 0.098
Constant -0.714** -0.652** -0.360** -0.347**
0.046 0.055 0.047 0.055
Observations 3597 3597 3597 3137 3137 3137
Standard errors in italics below coefficient estimates
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
D 65 is a dummy variable. =1 if age≥65, =0 otherwise
D 60 is a dummy variable. =1 if age≥60, =0 otherwise
The marginal effects correspond to the coefficient estimates of the probit estimates evaluated at X bar
The svy-probit coefficient estimates adjust for the complex survey design
‘flextime’ = 1 if person works in a job with flexible hours
‘flextime’ = 0 if a person works in a ‘job with fixed hours
‘flextime’ is undefined if a person does not work
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Standard errors in italics below coefficient estimates
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
D 65 is a dummy variable. =1 if age≥65, =0 otherwise
D 60 is a dummy variable. =1 if age≥60, =0 otherwise
‘flextime’ = 1 if person works in a job with flexible hours
‘flextime’ = 0 if a person works in a job with fixed hours




Figure 3.1: Effect of Pension on Budget Constraint
Figure 3.2: Proportion Receiving Old Age Pension by Gender
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Figure 3.3: Average Years of Education by Gender
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Figure 3.4a: African Males: Works
Figure 3.4b: African Males: Works, excluding subsistence agriculture
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Figure 3.4c: African Males: In Labor Force (broad definition)
Figure 3.4d: African Males: Retired
69
Figure 3.4e: African Males: Accept ‘Reasonable Offer’
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Figure 3.5a: African Females: Works
Figure 3.5b: African Females: Works, excluding subsistence agriculture
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Figure 3.5c: African Females: In Labor Force (broad definition)
Figure 3.5d: African Females: Retired
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Figure 3.5e: African Females: Accept ‘Reasonable Offer’
73
Figure 3.6: Ratio in flexi-time employment to full time employment
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Figure 3.7: Age Distribution of African Sub-population
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Figure 3.8a: African Males in Labor Force: Discontinuity at 63
Figure 3.8b: African Males in Labor Force: Discontinuity at 64
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Figure 3.8c: African Males in Labor Force: Discontinuity at 65
Figure 3.8d: African Males in Labor Force: Discontinuity at 66
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Figure 3.8e: African Males in Labor Force: Discontinuity at 67
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Figure 3.9a: African Females in Labor Force: Discontinuity at 58
Figure 3.9b: African Females in Labor Force: Discontinuity at 59
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Figure 3.9c: African Females in Labor Force: Discontinuity at 60
Figure 3.9d: African Females in Labor Force: Discontinuity at 61
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Figure 3.9e: African Females in Labor Force: Discontinuity at 62
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CHAPTER IV
The Impact of Colorblind Admissions on the Educational
Expectations of Texas High School Graduates
4.1 Introduction
The end of affirmative action in Texas due to the 1996 Hopwood v. Texas decision led
to precipitous drops in minority enrollment at the University of Texas at Austin and Texas
A&M University-College Station. In order to reverse the decline in minority enrollment
at Texas’s elite public institutions, the Texas legislature passed House Bill 588 or the Top
Ten Percent Rule (TTPR) which was signed into law on May 20, 1997 by then governor
George W. Bush. The Top Ten Percent Rule grants automatic admission to any public
college or university in Texas for Texas high school graduates who both finish in the top
decile of their graduating cohort and submit a completed application for admission to a
qualifying postsecondary institution within two years of graduating.1
The Top Ten Percent Rule did not have a large enough effect on minority applicants
to restore minority enrollment to the levels obtained prior to the Hopwood v. Texas
decision. Texas’s Attorney General interpreted the decision handed down in Hopwood v.
Texas by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to mean that race or ethnicity could factor
into neither the decision to admit a student nor the decision to provide financial aid.
Two selective institutions in Texas, The University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M
University-College Station, identified a set of high schools with student bodies that were,
1House Bill 588 also allows each public college or university in Texas to annually determine if it will offer automatic
admission to graduates in the top quartile and provides each institution with a list of eighteen factors that can be used in
making admissions decisions if a student does not qualify for automatic admissions
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on average, socioeconomically disadvantaged and had not had many students matriculate
at the respective institutions.
The University of Texas at Austin identified 70 Texas high schools that were both poor
and, which historically, had not had many students matriculate at the University of Texas
at Austin. These schools, on average, consisted of student bodies that were more than
ninety percent minority (Tienda and Niu, 2006). The most deserving graduates at these
high schools were offered scholarships, smaller classes, and tutoring if they were admitted to
the University of Texas at Austin. The funding is not exclusively for Top Ten Graduates.
This program, which was introduced to selected Texas High schools in 1999, 2000, and
2001, is known as the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship (LOS) Program.2
Texas A&M followed suit with its Century Scholars program which offers scholarships
to the graduates of 40 high schools located in Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio. The
Century Scholars (CS) Program began in the fall of 2000. The high schools were selected
based on high poverty rates of their students and the low number of applications that these
schools sent to Texas A&M University-College Station.3
The Top Ten Percent rule and the institution of the targeted financial aid and recruit-
ment programs offer the opportunity to examine two questions:
1. What is the impact of both the increased emphasis and transparent use of class rank
on the score-report sending behavior of Texas’s High School Graduates? The sending
of a score report to a college or university is our proxy for an application.
2. How does targeted financial aid and recruitment affect the application behavior of
potential recipients?
The use of race in the admissions process remains a contentious issue across this country.
California, Washington State, and, most recently, Michigan have passed bans that forbid
2The Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship information was obtained from Dr. Lawrence W. Burt, former associate vice
president and director of student financial services at the University of Texas at Austin.
3The Century Scholar program information was obtained from correspondence with Myra Gonzalez, Associate Director
Office of Honors Programs and Academic Scholarships at Texas A&M - College Station.
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the use of race in both the admissions and financial aid processes. Knowledge of how
prospective students respond to race neutral admissions regimes is vital to institutions of
higher learning that are interested in maintaining a diverse student body.
Two of the selective institutions in Texas responded by both increasing recruitment
efforts and offering financial aid to high schools that were likely to yield students who
were members of under-represented minority groups. In addressing the second question,
we explore the efficacy of such programs by asking: Do students from the targeted high
schools increase the rate that they send score reports to the university that targeted the
high school relative to the rate that would have prevailed had there been no intervention?
By exploring the behavior of potential applicants and their responsiveness to targeted
recruitment and financial aid, we will enhance our understanding of the determinants of
student application behavior.
4.2 Previous Research
Card and Krueger (2004, 2005) examine the impact of ending affirmative action in
California and Texas on the score report sending behavior of highly qualified minority
applicants. Card and Krueger have information on all SAT takers in California and Texas
from 1994–2001. Using the sending of a score report as a proxy for applying to a college,
they find that highly qualified minorities—minorities with an A/A- grade point average or
a score of at least 1150 on the SAT—did not substantially alter the set of institutions that
they choose to send their score reports in response to the changes in admissions policies.
Long (2004), using a random sample of ten percent of all SAT I takers from 1996–
2000, finds that the gap between minorities and non-minorities in the number of score
reports sent to in-state public institutions widened. He simulates the effect of the change
in state policies on the number of score reports of minority and non-minority students and
compares the results of the simulation to the actual outcomes. The simulation predicts
both a decrease in the number of score reports sent to top-tier public colleges by minorities
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and an increase in the number of score reports sent to top-tier colleges by non-minorities
due to changes in the relative probability of admissions between minority and non-minority
applicants.
Dickson (2006) analyzes the impact of the change in the admissions regime in Texas
on the percent of graduates from Texas’s public high schools who attempt an admissions
examination, either the SAT or SAT. Using data from the Texas Education Agency’s Aca-
demic Excellence Indicator System, Dickson constructs a balanced panel of high schools
and estimates weighted fixed effects models which include high school level covariates—
for example, the percentage of the high school that is black and the percentage of a the
high school that receives free or reduced price meal. Dummies for the various admissions
regimes as well as an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if the school is eligi-
ble for the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program are also included in the empirical
specification. Dickson finds a significant decrease in the percentage of graduates taking
admissions examinations after the implementation of the Top Ten Percent Rule. In addi-
tion, she finds that high schools that were selected as Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
schools experienced an increase in the percentage of graduates who attempted admissions
examinations.
Niu, Tienda, and Cortes (2006) use a representative sample of Texas high school seniors
in 2002 who were re-interviewed one year later to discern the effects of the Top Ten Percent
Rule. First, they find that Texas seniors—and top decile graduates in particular—are
sensitive to institutional selectivity. That is, Texas seniors prefer more selective institutions
all else equal. Second, they find that graduates from affluent high schools are more likely
than their counterparts from less-affluent high schools to apply to selective institutions.
Third, they find that while there are disparities in the selectivity of colleges that blacks
and Hispanics within the top decile apply to, these differences do not carry over into the
actual matriculation decision.
Our paper builds on this existing literature in various ways. First, we are interested
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in evaluating the transition from an admissions regime where class rank was merely one
factor that was used in differing degrees with respect to admissions to a regime where class
rank is the primary factor in admissions. Moreover, this fact is known to all interested
parties.4 In contrast to Card and Krueger (2004, 2005), we do not limit our sample to
highly qualified test-takers as measured by SAT performance or grade point average, as
the Top Ten Percent rule likely impacts students who aren’t highly qualified, especially
those students who are from high schools with relatively low test scores.5
Second, our data allows us to investigate in detail the set of schools a student chose
to send their scores to. Thus, whereas Long (2004) is able to only observe classifications
of the colleges that are designated to receive score reports, we observe the student’s full
choice set.
Third, only limited evidence has been gathered in the evaluation of targeted recruitment
programs. The only other paper that considers such programs is Dickson (2006). The
analysis in Dickson (2006) is conducted at the high-school level and focuses on the extensive
margin of test taking, the percent of graduates that attempt an admissions examination. In
addition, Dickson (2006) focuses only on the LOS program. Our data allows us to examine
the impact of both the LOS program and the CS program on the actual score report
sending behavior of individual students, conditional on a student having attempted the
SAT I examination. We believe that this provides a more direct measure of the effectiveness
of such programs. If the programs worked, then the probabilities that students from either
a LOS school or students from a CS school sent score reports to the University of Texas
at Austin and Texas A&M-College Station, respectively, should increase relative to the
probabilities for similar students from non-Longhorn high school and non-Century Scholar
schools.
In addition, our empirical method for evaluating the LOS differs considerably from
4For example, Bucks (2004) provides evidence that the University of Texas relied heavily on class rank prior to House Bill
588; however, this policy was not explicit.
5In our data set we identify 74, 472 students who self-identify as being in the top ten percent of their class and have SAT
scores less than 1150, one of the benchmarks they used to identify highly qualified students.
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that of Dickson (2006). In analyzing the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship, Dickson
(2006) draws inference from the dummy associated with Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
status. The fixed effects specification means that the variation used to identify the effect of
the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship comes from inter-temporal variation in Longhorn
status. The counterfactual high schools are the set of Longhorn Schools prior to the schools
obtaining Longhorn status and the set of high schools that never obtained Longhorn status.
Later in the paper, we show that Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship Schools have a higher
percentage of minority students, score lower on the SAT, and are less likely to to have
graduates attempt a college admissions examination. Because the Longhorn Opportunity
Scholarship schools are so different from other high schools in Texas, using the other high
schools in Texas as a comparison group could lead to biased estimates of the impact of the
Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program.
We take a number of steps to reduce the bias in estimating the impact of the targeted
recruitment and financial aid programs. We impose a common support condition to identify
a set of non-treated schools that are “similar” to the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
Schools. We compute the propensity score and use inverse probability weighting to identify
the average effect of treatment on the treated for students who attend LOS high schools
and CS high schools. Selection into treatment for these programs depended on the rate
at which the high school’s students sent score reports to either the University of Texas
at Austin or Texas A&M and the socioeconomic status of the high school’s students. We
directly include measures of the first factor and proxies for the second in calculating the
propensity scores. This is likely to provide better estimates of the true effects of the
LOS program and CS program than estimation procedures that ignore the problem of
non-random selection into treatment.
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4.3 Theory
We adopt verbatim the theoretical model presented in Card and Krueger (2004). In
this framework, a student needs to decide whether to apply to a particular college or not.
Relevant factors are the utility of attending the school being considered, the chance of
being admitted to that school, the cost of attending the school, the costs of applying, and
the corresponding factors in the set of available alternative colleges.
4.3.1 The Model
A student assigns a net utility level Ui(Qi, Ci) to attending college i. Utility increases
with the quality of the institution (Qi) and decreases with the cost of attending the in-
stitution (Ci). The student estimates the probability of being admitted to school i with
probability pi, which is, for simplicity, assumed to be independent across schools. The cost
of applying to any school is d and the utility of not attending college is U0.
Optimizing behavior on the part of the student generates an application set C consisting
of an ordered list of J schools with U1 ≤ U2 ≤ . . . ≤ UJ . A necessary condition for applying
to a given school i is that Ui > U0, and that the student’s subjective estimate of the
probability of admission is strictly positive. Let πj represent the probability that school j
is the best school in C that admits the student. Then




Let C(∼ k) denote the optimal choice set when school k is excluded, and J(∼ k) represent





πj max[0, Uk − Uj]} − d > 0 (4.2)
The above equation defines the condition for including school k in the choice set. It
states that college k will be included in the optimal application set if the expected return
of attending college k exceeds the cost of applying.
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4.4 Some predictions from the model
This simple framework is useful to clarify the effects we expect to identify empirically.6
The introduction of the Top Ten Percent Rule changes the subjective estimation of the
probability of admission conditional on rank and the type of institution under considera-
tion. In particular, for students in the top decile, the probability of admission to any of
Texas’s public colleges or universities is one. For Texas high school graduates who aren’t in
the top decile, the impact of change in the admissions regime is not clear. Perhaps students
not in the top decile perceive that their probability of admission, pi, has declined at elite
public institutions. If this is the case, then students in the lower rank classifications are
more likely to submit scores to both less selective institutions within Texas and selective
institutions outside of the state of Texas. The perceived change in the probability of ad-
mission will cause some colleges to be added and other colleges to be deleted relative to the
optimal choice set that would have prevailed absent the change in the admissions regime.
Conversely, students in the top decile should be more likely to submit score reports to
more selective institutions in Texas and less likely to submit to less selective institutions.
The introduction of the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship at UT Austin and the Cen-
tury Scholars Program at Texas A&M, on the other hand, changed the expected costs of
attending these two colleges for students at the eligible schools. This effectively increases
the expected utility, Ui from attending one of these schools, which should increase the like-
lihood that the applicant places either the University of Texas at Austin or Texas A&M
University in the optimal college choice set.
4.5 Data
The data we use for this paper was obtained from two sources. First, we downloaded
Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS) data from the Texas Educational Agency
(TEA). This is high school level data, available publicly on the internet, which provides
6A more complete discussion of the model and its implications is presented in the original paper by Card and Krueger
(2004).
91
a wide range of information on the performance of students in each school and district
in Texas for each academic year. Indicators include Texas Assessment of Academic Skills
(TAAS) performance, attendance rates, dropout rates, completion rates, and SAT/ACT
test results.” 7
Second, we used extremely rich student level data from the College Board. This data set
contains the SAT verbal and math scores of every high school senior in the state of Texas
who took the SAT exam, for the 1996–2004 cohorts. Student demographic information
was also available including age, race, and gender.8 We also utilized information on the
number of test scores each student sent to colleges, as well as the name of the destination
college.
Both data sets contained the name of the student’s high school, enabling us to merge
the two data sets and conduct analyses that include both high school and student level
information. In addition, we used information provided on the SAT Questionnaire (for-
merly known as the Student Descriptive Questionnaire). Most students taking either the
SAT Reasoning Test or any of the SAT Subject Tests also complete the optional SAT
Questionnaire when they register to take the SAT Program tests, providing valuable con-
textual information to aid in interpreting and understanding individual and group scores.
The questionnaire asks students about their family background, high school courses and
performance, college aspirations, and most importantly for this study, a student’s class
rank. It should be stressed that the SAT Questionnaire, as well as any particular question,
is voluntary. Moreover, the responses are all self-reported.
Table 4.1 provides some descriptive statistics of our data set. We include only students
for whom we are able to merge these data sets. This excludes primarily students in private
and charter high schools. In total, we have 916,348 remaining unique student observations
7The URL is “http://www.tea.state.tx.us/”
8We only have racial information for students from the 1999 cohort onwards
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across all years combined, with a mean number of test takers of about 102,000 per year. 9
Of these, approximately 11 percent are Black, 17 percent are Hispanic and 46 percent are
White, with a sizable proportion for whom we do not have racial information. Roughly 54.5
percent of takers are female, and the average performance of these Texas graduates is 458
points and 466 points on the verbal and mathematical component of the SAT, respectively.
4.6 Empirical Specifications
4.6.1 Score Report Sending
We use the inter-temporal variation in the importance of rank with respect to the
probability of admissions to identify the impact of the change in the admissions regime on
the score report sending behavior of Texas’s public high school graduates. We estimate
linear probability models of the following form:










ist×P )+ εist (4.3)
Yist, our outcome, is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one in the event that
student i in high school s in year t engages in a particular behavior with respect to score
report sending. Examples of the outcomes that Yist represent include the following: does
a student send a score report to a selective institution in Texas, does the student send
a score report to one of the schools that must abide by the Top Ten Percent rule, does
the student send at least one score report to a less-selective institution in Texas, does the
student send more than four score reports in total.10
We include both high-school fixed effects, αs, and a linear time trend, αt. We include
year specific high school level variables, Xst. Xist are individual level characteristics; we
include the individual’s verbal SAT score and the math SAT score. Pre is an indicator
variable for the 1996 cohort that applied during the pre-Hopwood regime. P is an indicator
9The original sample size was 1,068,071 individuals.
10The first four score reports are free. A student must pay a fee for each additional score report that he or she chooses to
send.
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variable that assumes a value of one for cohorts that are under the Top Ten Percent regime.
The Rjist are a series of six rank dummies. We include dummies that assume a value of
one if student i in school s in year t identifies as being in one of the following categories:
the first decile, the second decile, the second quintile, the fourth quintile, the fifth quintile,
and non-reported rank . The excluded category consists of students who are in the third
quintile. We cluster at the high school level to produce standard errors that are both robust
to using variables that are at a higher level of aggregation than the micro-units (Moulton,
1990) and to allow for arbitrary temporal correlation of the εist’s within a cluster (Bertrand
et al., 2004).
The coefficients of interest are δjP , the coefficients associated with the interaction terms,
Rjist×P . To flesh out the interpretation of the δjP consider the following example. Let Yist
represent the event that a student sends to a selective university in Texas and consider the
coefficient associated with the interaction term between the indicator for the top decile and
the indicator dummy for the Top Ten Percent Rule admissions regime. This coefficient
can be interpreted as the difference in the probability that a student in the top decile
sends a score report to a selective institution relative to the probability that she would
have sent a score report to a selective university in Texas prior to the advent of the Top
Ten Percent Rule. Similar interpretations apply to the coefficient estimates with respect
to both different rank categorizations and different outcomes.
4.6.2 Targeted Recruitment and Financial Aid
We are interested in determining the average effect of the treatment on the treated with
respect to both the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program and the Century Scholar
program. If we naively compared schools that were chosen to receive the scholarships with
the schools that were not selected, then we would likely obtain biased estimates of the
impact of the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship. The schools that are selected to receive
the treatment are likely to be systematically different in important ways that affect the
outcome of interest. Therefore, we need to select an appropriate set of non-treated high
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schools that are “similar” to the set of schools that were selected to receive either the
Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program or the Century Scholar program.
The LOS program and the CS programs were designed to boost minority enrollment
at the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M-College Station, respectively. As
such, high schools where the student body was majority white were unlikely to be selected
to receive either the LOS program or the CS program. We trimmed the sample of high
schools with students bodies that had high concentrations of white students in the year
1996. For the LOS program, we trimmed high schools with a percentage of white students
that exceeded 66 percent of the student body in 1996. For the CS program we trimmed
the sample of high schools with a percentage of white students that exceeded 75 percent
of the student body in 1996. The maximum value of the percentage of the student body
that is white in 1996 for LOS schools and CS schools is 41.7 percent and 60.3 percent,
respectively. In evaluating the LOS program, the trimming resulted in 886 high schools
being dropped from consideration. In evaluating the CS program, the trimming resulted
in 757 schools being dropped from consideration. The total number of high schools in our
base sample is 1440.
Using the trimmed samples, we estimate the probabilities that these particular Texas
high schools are selected to receive either the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship or the
Century Scholar Program, P(Longhorn|X) or P(Century|X). That is, we estimate the
propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) of treatment by either of the programs on
the appropriate sample.11 The common support condition means that we are interested
in comparing treated and non-treated schools with similar values of ̂P(Longhorn|X) or
̂P(Century|X). The common support condition is implemented as follows:
max(min[ ̂P(T = 1|X), ̂P(T = 0|X)]) , min(max[ ̂P(T = 1|X), ̂P(T = 0|X)])
where T is either the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program or the Century Scholar
11We use a probit specification that include as regressors high school level characteristics prior to the start of the Longhorn
Opportunity Scholarship program and the Century Scholar Program for the years 1996− 1998.
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program. The above condition establishes the set of schools that will be used in the anal-
ysis. The common support condition for the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program
includes high schools with estimated propensity scores in the interval .02 to .93 inclusive.
The common support condition for the Century Scholar program includes high schools
with estimated propensity scores in the interval .01 to .74 inclusive.
Histograms of the propensity scores for the LOS schools and CS schools are shown in
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.3, respectively. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.4 are adjusted histograms
of the propensity scores. Essentially, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.4 remove the huge spikes
near zero. This readjusts the scale of the graphs to better show the full distribution of the
propensity scores.
Table 4.2a and Table 4.2b demonstrate the effects of the balancing. The LOS pro-
gram and CS program schools are remarkably different from non-LOS schools and non-CS
schools.
In Table 4.2a, Column I contains the average of a particular characteristic for non-LOS
schools minus the average of the same characteristic for LOS schools. Examining the tables
we see that LOS schools have student bodies with higher percentage of Hispanic students,
black students, students on free or reduced price lunch, limited English proficient students
and higher student-to-teacher ratios. The LOS and non-LOS schools are clearly different.
Column II and Column III demonstrates how trimming and trimming in conjunction with
inverse probability weighting using the propensity score, respectively, reduces the differ-
ences in the observables. Table 4.2b shows the effects of balancing with respect to the
difference between CS and non-CS schools.12
We make a conditional independence assumption and employ inverse probability weight-
ing (Horvitz and Thompson, 1952; DiNardo et al., 1996) to estimate models of the following
form:
12We only show the balancing results for the year 1996. Similar results are obtained for the other years. This is expected
as these measures are highly correlated over time.
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ist × P ) +
∑
δjT (DT ×Rjist) + εist (4.4)
Yist is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if the student submits a score
report to the University of Texas at Austin. The terms αs, αt, Xst, Xist, P re, P, R
j
ist,
and Rjist × P are the same as the previous specification. DT is an indicator variable that
assumes a value of one the year a school becomes a Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
School when analyzing the LOS program. DT is an indicator variable that assumes a value
of one the year that a high school becomes a Century Scholar school when we analyze
the CS program. DT × Rjist is an interaction term. The coefficient associated with the
interaction term, δjT is the difference-in-differences estimate. However, in this case we limit
the sample to students in schools that survive the trimming procedure.
We weight the students in the non-treated schools by P
1−P × 1−ΠΠ where P is equal
to propensity score for either the LOS program or the CS program for the particular
school that the student attends and Π is equal to the unconditional probability of being
either a LOS school or a CS school. This weighting scheme re-weights students in non-
treated schools so that, on average, they are similar to students in treated schools. With
a defensible set of counterfactuals, we are able to reduce the bias in the estimates of
the impact of the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship program and the Century Scholar
programs. We cluster at the level of the high school to deal with the aggregation issues
raised by Moulton (1990) and the serial correlation issues raised by Bertrand et al. (2004).
4.7 Results and Discussion
Our analysis comprises of three sections. First, we summarize our data in terms of the
outcome variables of interest. This provides a broad overview of trends and aggregates
for high school seniors in Texas. Second, we estimate how student behavior changed in
the TTPR period relative to the prior two years using multivariate regressions. We next
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investigate the effects of the LOS program and CS on score report sending behavior. For
the TTPR the LOS program, and CS, we estimate standard OLS models as well as models
that include school level fixed effects.
4.7.1 Summary Statistics
4.7.1.1 Score Sending
Table 4.3 presents the mean values of various score sending outcomes. We see that the
mean number of scores sent for each SAT taker declined between 1996 and 2004, from 4.29
scores to 3.86 scores, an 11 percent decline. This is also reflected in the mean numbers sent
to Texas based institutions. In terms of the selective schools we consider, the proportion
of SAT takers sending to the University of Texas at Austin drops by 4 percentage points
from 35.5 percent to 31.5 percent, the proportion to the University of Texas at Dallas grew
by 2.7 percentage points from 3.1 percent to 5.8 percent, while the proportion sending
to Texas A&M decreased by 7 percentage points from 31.2 percent to 23.3 percent. On
average, the proportion sending to any of these three schools decreased by 7.1 percentage
points, or about 14 percent relative to the 1996 level. Thus, we observe that both the
number of scores sent, and the proportion sending to selective schools decreased markedly
in the period of our study.
In Table 4.4a, we observe an increasing trend in the proportion who refuse to answer the
entire Student Descriptive Questionnaire (SDQ), although this occurs largely in 2003 an
2004. At the same time, there is a gradual and persistent upward trend in the proportion
who answer parts of the SDQ, but refuse to respond to the question on class rank. The
increase is large, from 8651 in 1996 to 33829 in 2004, which is almost a quadrupling in
absolute number. Indeed, by 2004, more than a third of takers do not respond to the class
rank question. This is problematic for our analysis, as a significant portion of our analysis
is related to the class rank variable. Thus, all results making reference to the class rank
variable pertains only to those students who provided us with such information.
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Table 4.4b captures the mean proportion taking the SAT by class rank. This was
computed for each school by dividing the total number of SAT takers reporting a particular
rank in a given school in a given year, by the number of twelfth graders in that particular
rank in that same school in that same year. The number of twelfth graders was obtained
from Texas’s Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS) data set. The mean was
calculated by averaging across schools within a year, where each school received equal
weighting in the calculation. We observe that the mean proportion in the first decile
exceeds one for 1996 and 1997. Therefore, there has to be some misreporting in the data,
with students systematically overstating their rank. Within each rank, the proportion
taking the SAT decreased, although this is possibly due to the increased non-response rate
for the class rank question. Nevertheless, we do observe sustained downward trends in the
proportions taking an SAT conditional on them answering the class rank question. There
are also large differences in test taking across rank classifications, which is to be expected.
In 2004, the ratio of students who reported being in the top decile relative to one tenth
of the number of twelfth graders is 0.90, compared to an analogous ratio of 0.376 for the
second quintile, and only 0.051 for students in the lowest quintile.
Tables 4.4c and 4.4d provide the mean performance on the SAT verbal and mathematics
components respectively, in each rank category for each year. Somewhat reassuring is that
the performances are monotonically decreasing in rank, amongst those who do report a
rank. We also observe that 2002 seems to be an outlier year, in that performance on both
the verbal and mathematics component of the SAT greatly exceed those in other years.
These tables also indicate that the students for whom we have no class rank information
are not likely to be randomly drawn from the population of SAT takers in terms of their
scholastic abilities in the period from 2002 to 2004. Prior to 2002, these students were on
average likely to be placed somewhere between the 2nd and 3rd quintiles, whereas there-
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after, their mean performance places them between the 2nd decile and the 2nd quintile. 13
Tables 4.5a – 4.5i summarize the various dimensions of score sending behavior within
each class rank category. This allows us to observe any heterogeneity in the trends that
occur as a function of a student’s relative rank within their high school cohort. The mean
number of scores sent decreases for most categories, although this is largest for those in
the first decile (Table 4.5a). The mean number of scores sent to colleges within Texas
decreased as well, most markedly in the first and second deciles, but was stable in the
fourth quintile and actually increased for those in the fifth quintile (Table 4.5b). Table
4.5c shows the mean number of scores sent to schools that are legally compelled to follow
the Top Ten Percent rule. For all students who do report a valid class rank variable, this
number remains fairly stable. The next table concerns score sending to Texas two year
colleges. The mean numbers here are also relatively stable. 14
Tables 4.5e – 4.5g summarize the proportion sending to each of the three selective
schools we consider, namely UT Austin, UT Dallas and Texas A&M. Table 4.5h presents
the mean number of scores sent to this set of selective schools on aggregate, and Table
4.5i contains the proportion of students who send to at least one of these selective schools.
Students in the top decile in 2004 are 2.2 percentage points more likely to send to UT
Austin than similar students in 1996, while students in the other reported ranks in 2004
are generally less likely to send to Austin than their 1996 counterparts. 15 Score sending
to UT Dallas increases in every category, although this occurs off of a rather small initial
base. In all reported class ranks we observe a clear decrease in the proportion sending to
Texas A&M, with large decreases of about nine percentage points in the first two deciles
13We use deciles for the first and second deciles, and quintiles for the remainder, as this is how the question that asks a
student to report her rank is structured.
14Two year colleges are not the primary focus of this paper. Moreover, the SAT is taken primarily for applications to
selective colleges. Thus, we do not comment in depth on the application decision for two year colleges.
15An exception is students in the 5th quintile, although these students represent a very small percentage of the population
of SAT takers in any year.
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as well as the second quintile. Table 4.5i indicates that approximately seventy percent of
students in the first decile send to at least one selective school, and that this remains stable
during the period of analysis. However, students in the other reported class rank categories
generally show marked declines in the probability of sending to a selective school. This
is most pronounced for students in the 2nd quintile, where the proportion decreases by
about 10 percentage points, or almost 20 percent of the 1996 base proportion. This is in
line with the model provided above, as those far from the first decile will need to compete
aggressively in order to gain admission into selective schools compelled to admit anyone in
the top 10 percent of their cohort.
4.7.1.2 Longhorn and Century Scholars Programs
Tables 4.6a – 4.6c show the number of test takers, the proportion of twelfth graders
taking an SAT, and the proportion of SAT takers who send a score to UT Austin respec-
tively. Table 4.6a shows that regardless of the scholarship program being administered at
a school, if any, the number of takers increased with time. We also observe that more than
10 percent of all public school SAT takers attend a school where the LOS was subsequently
implemented. The proportion taking an SAT increases dramatically in the LOS schools,
by more than 20 percent, actually decreases in the CS only schools, and increases by a few
percentage points in the non-scholarship programs. Moreover, the large increases observed
in the LOS schools coincides with the time period when the LOS was introduced. Further
suggestive evidence that LOS caused these responses is seen in Table 4.6c. Whereas the
proportion of score senders sending to UT Austin actually decreased with time by about
5 percentage points between 1996 and 2004, the proportion from LOS schools increased
by about 3 percentage points. These patterns are observed in Table 4.7 as well, where we
summarize the schools using a binary classification of LOS or non-LOS schools, ignoring
the particular potential school’s CS status.
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4.7.2 Top Ten Percent Rule
4.7.2.1 Score Sending
Table 4.8 presents individual level regression results for score sending behavior. Of
primary interest to us are the coefficients on the post and post interacted with class rank
variables. The dependent variable in the second column is an indicator variable for whether
the student sent more than four SAT score reports. In the post period, students in the
1st decile were 5.6 percentage points less likely to send out more than four scores. Those
in the 2nd decile and second quintile were also significantly less likely to send out more
than four reports, but the decrease is less than 2 percentage points. In the third column,
we model the actual number of scores sent. Most students send fewer scores on average
in the post period. However, this again is most pronounced amongst students who are
in the 1st decile, who send 0.353 16 fewer scores out. This is as predicted by the theory,
since these students are guaranteed admission to any of the top public colleges in Texas.
In the fourth column, the dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value
of one if a student sends a score to one of the non-selective four year colleges in Texas.
In the post period, students in the 1st decile are significantly less likely to apply to a
non-selective school. At the same time, those in the 4th and 5th quintiles who do take an
SAT have a significantly increased probability of sending to a non-selective college. This
suggests that students of all ranks are being forced by the law to pre-select themselves into
a particular type of college more strongly than prior to the law. The estimates in the sixth
column shows that students in the first decile have an increased probability of sending to
UT Austin in the post-TTPR period, of 3.8 percentage points, while students in the 2nd
quintile have a small, but significant reduction in this probability. Interestingly, students
in the 5th quintile show a large increase in the probability of sending there, although we
observed that this group is small and likely to be selected in terms of other unobservables.




Table 4.9 presents models with the same dependent variables and same set of covariates,
but includes school level fixed effects. Of note in comparison to Table 4.8 is that the
coefficients are very similar, both in terms of magnitude and significance. By and large,
the theoretical framework predictions of the impact of the law are substantiated by the
empirical analysis.
4.7.3 Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship
This component of our analysis looks at the effects of the targeted recruitment and
financial aid packages offered by the University of Texas at Austin under the LOS program.
This program targeted high schools with both socioeconomically disadvantaged students
and graduates who send standardized test scores to UT Austin at a rate below the average
rate at which Texas high school graduates send score reports to UT Austin.
Table 4.10 presents difference-in-differences (DD) results for various score sending be-
haviors as a function of the LOS program. We further allow for these effects to differ
depending on the class rank of the students. Interpreting the coefficients on the interac-
tion terms, we observe that most of the effects manifest in the first decile of students. The
probability that a student in the first decile at a Longhorn school sends to Austin increases
by 9.7 percentage points in the DD model. In 1999, 20.0 percent of test takers from LOS
schools sent at least one score report to the University of Texas at Austin. Relative to
the 1999 level, the change in the first decile is a 48.5% increase. The coefficients associ-
ated with the interaction of being LOS and self-identifying as being in the second decile
increase the probability of increasing of sending to to the University of Texas at Austin by
3.4 percentage points. The coefficient is statistically significant at the one percent level.
The second dependent variable is the total number of score reports sent. The coefficients
associated with the interaction terms are all small and statistically insignificant.
The third dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if a
103
student sends a score report to a non-selective four year institution in Texas.17 Surprisingly,
the coefficient associated with the interaction term between being in a LOS school and a
self-reported rank of being in the top decile is 4.9 percentage points and is statistically
significant at the one percent level.
The fourth dependent variable is a set of selective schools in Texas.18 The coefficient
associated with the interaction term between LOS and a self-reported rank of the top decile
is 8.2 percentage points and is statistically significant at the one percent level.
The fifth dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes a value of one if the
test-taker chooses to send at least one score report to the set of colleges in Texas that
must abide by the Top Ten Percent Rule. The difference-in-differences estimate of the
effect of the LOS program on the first decile is 5.4 percentage points, and it is statistically
significant at the one percent level.
The sixth dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if a
test-taker sends at least one score report to the a school in Texas. Students in the top
decile at a LOS school are 1.2 percentage points more likely to send to an in-state college
or university. This effect is relatively small as a large proportion of test takers send at
least one score report to an in-state school.
The final dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if a
test-taker chooses to indicate more that four colleges to receive score reports. SAT test
takers in the first decile at LOS schools are 3.5 percentage points more likely to send more
than four score reports. We find small and statistically insignificant effects of the LOS
program on the probability of designating more than four colleges to receive score reports
for the remaining interaction terms.
Table 4.11 presents the results from the difference-in-differences model with fixed effects.
The results we obtain are fairly similar. Test-takers who self-identify as being in the top
decile at schools under the LOS program are 9.9 percentage points more likely to submit
17Colleges are classified as non-selective according to the system used by Barron’s Guide to Colleges and Universities
18Selective schools include the University of Texas at Austin, Texas A&M-College Station, and the University of Texas at
Dallas.
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a score report to the University of Texas at Austin; the coefficient is significant at the
one percent level. Students who self-identify as being in the second decile at LOS schools
are 3.3 percentage points more likely to send a score report to the University of Texas at
Austin; the coefficient is significant at the one percent level. Students who self-identify as
being in the second quintile at LOS schools are 2.4 percentage points more likely to send
a score report to the University of Texas at Austin.
With respect to non-selective institutions, the difference-in-differences estimate of the
impact of the LOS program on the probability of a test-taker in the top decile submitting
to a non-selective dropped to 3.9 percentage points, roughly a 20.0 percent decline relative
to the estimate from the model without fixed effects. Still, the estimate is statistically
significant at the five percent level.
The fixed effects difference-in-differences estimate of the impact of the LOS program
on the probability of a test taker in the top decile submitting to a selective institution in
Texas is 8.7 percentage points an increase of .5 percentage points relative to the estimate
from the model without school fixed effects; the estimate is statistically significant at the
one percent level. The estimate of the difference-in-differences estimate of the impact of
the LOS program on the probability of students in the top decile submitting to a TTPR
school is 5.5 percentage points and is significant at the one percent level. The finding that
students in the top decile at LOS schools are 1.1 percentage more likely to remain in state
is significant at the five percent level.
Overall, this is a remarkable finding. The impact of the LOS is large and significant. It
also has the largest impact on the best ranked students in these schools. Indeed, the effects
on weaker students are small and often statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that student application decisions from under-represented
schools are subject to multiple constraints. These include both the likelihood of admission
as well as funding and post-enrollment support.
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4.7.4 Century Scholars Program
This part of the analysis will focus on the Century Scholars Program. Table 4.12
contains the results of the difference-in-differences models without school fixed effects.
The first dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if the
student sends a score report to Texas A&M-College Station. The difference-in-differences
estimate of the impact of the Century Scholar program on the likelihood that a test-
taker who self identifies as being in the first decile sends a score report to Texas A&M
College Station is 3.9 percentage points, and is significant at the five percent level. This is
considerably smaller than the analogous estimate for the LOS program. None of the other
interaction terms are significant.
The second dependent variable is the total number of scores sent. The difference-in-
differences estimates of the impact of the CS program on number of score reports sent by
the first and second decile are −.287 and −.251 score reports. The estimates are both
significant at the one percent level.
The third dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes a value of one if a
test-taker sends to a non-selective school. For students who self-identify a class ranking in
the third and fourth quintiles, the difference-in-differences estimates take on values of −5.7
and −8.2 percentage points respectively. The estimates are significant at the one percent
level. The CS program seems to reduce the probability that lower ranked students send
score reports to non-selective institutions.
The Century Scholar program increases the probability that a student who chooses not
to indicate rank sends a score report to a selective institution by 3.3 percentage points.
This estimate is significant at the one percent level. This result is not surprising given the
positive impact of the CS program on the likelihood that a student who does not indicate
rank applies to Texas A&M. Texas A&M is one of the selective schools. The difference in
differences estimates for the impact of the CS program on the probability that a student
who identifies as being in ranked in the top decile is 4.0 percentage points; the estimate is
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significant at the one percent level.
Students in the top decile at CS high schools are 3.6 percentage points more likely to
apply to a school with admissions that are subject to the Top Ten Percent rule. The
difference-in-differences estimates for the impact of the CS program on the likelihood that
test-takers of various ranks send score reports to Texas are small and statistically insignif-
icant.
The CS program does seem to impact the probability that students from in the top
decile and second deciles send more than four score reports. The difference-in-differences
estimate for the test-takers who identify as being in the top decile is −4.2 percentage points
and is significant at the one percent level. The estimate of the impact of the program on
the probability of sending more than four score reports for a student whose self-reported
rank is the second decile is −5.0 percentage points; the estimate is statistically significant
at the one percent level.
Table 4.13 contains the results for the difference-in-differences models that include high
school level fixed effects. Students in the top decile are 4.2 percentage points more likely
to send a score report to Texas A&M-College Station, and the estimate is statistically
significant at the five percent level. This is similar to the estimate we obtained without
fixed effects.
The difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the CS program on number of
score reports sent by the first and second decile are −.270 and −.229 score reports. The
estimates are both significant at the one percent level.
The difference-in-difference estimates for the test-takers in the third quintile and test-
takers who identify as being in the fourth quintile remain remain statistically significant,
with values of −4.2 percentage points and −6.2 percentage points, respectively.
Test-takers in CS schools who do not indicate rank or self-report being in the top decile
are more likely to send score reports to selective institutions. The estimates are similar
to the estimates obtained from the model without school fixed effects. The estimate for
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students who don’t report rank is 3.4 percentage points and is statistically significant at
the five percent level. The difference-in-differences estimate for students in the top decile
is 4.5 percentage points; the estimate is significant at the one percent level. The other
differences-in-differences estimates are similar in magnitude relative to the model with no
fixed effects, and are also not statistically significant.
The estimate of the impact of the CS program on the likelihood that a test-taker who
self-reports as being in the top decile sends a score report to a TTPR schools remains nearly
the same across specifications. The estimate obtains a value of 3.7 percentage points and
is significant at the one percent level. The addition of school fixed effects does not change
appreciably change the estimates of impact of the CS program on the likelihood that test-
takers send score reports to in-state schools. The estimates remain small and statistically
insignificant.
Test takers in the top decile and the second decile at CS schools are less likely to send out
more than four score reports, estimates for these ranks take on values of −4.2 percentage
points and −4.8 percentage points; both estimates are statistically significant at the one
percent level. The sign of the difference-in-differences estimate for the second quintile is
of similar magnitude to the estimates without fixed effects.
The Century Scholar program, while not as successful as the Longhorn Opportunity
Scholarship program, does appear to attract highly ranked students to Texas A&M. The
magnitude of the impact of the LOS program on the likelihood that a student who self
reports as being in the top decile at a LOS school sends a score report to the University of
Texas at Austin is 136 percent larger than the estimate of the impact of the CS program
on the likelihood that a student who self-reports as being in the top decile in a CS school
sends to Texas A&M-College Station.
There is evidence that the CS program reduces the probability that low ranked students
send score reports to non-selective schools.We find evidence that the CS program increases
the probability that both students who don’t report rank and students who report being
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in the top decile send score reports to selective institutions. The CS program increases the
probability that test-takers in the top decile send a score report to colleges that must abide
by the Top Ten Percent rule; although the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship Program
has a larger impact on the probability that students in the top decile send score reports
to Top Ten Percent colleges. The CS program also appears to reduce the probability that
highly ranked students send more than four score reports.
4.8 Conclusion
Our analysis and results highlighted some important and useful new insights. First,
the theoretical framework we adopted was useful in understanding the changes that were
observed in student college applications behavior. Second, as predicted, there exists signif-
icant heterogeneity in the effects of the law, depending on a student’s class rank. Previous
research has not investigated this.
Third, the targeted recruitment program implemented by UT Austin was extremely
successful. This success was limited mostly to the best students in these schools. The
targeted recruitment program implemented by the Century Scholar program was also ef-
fective at increasing the likelihood that students send score reports to Texas A&M, but
slightly less so than the LOS program.
Our evidence suggests that students from poor schools face multiple barriers to obtaining
postsecondary schooling at selective colleges. Using the combination of the TTPR and the
LOS and CS programs, we find strong evidence that it is possible for targeted recruitment
programs to attract students from such schools.
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4.9 Tables
Table 4.1: Sample Size and composition
Year # of Obs % Black % Hisp % Cauc. % Female Mean SAT-V Mean SAT-M
1996 83,769 – – – 54.7 460 466
1997 87,750 – – – 54.73 459 467
1998 94,136 – – – 54.84 456 463
1999 98,730 11.45 16.54 51.95 54.73 453 459
2000 103,367 11.11 16.57 49.46 54.41 454 461
2001 105,015 11.22 16.73 47.87 54.57 452 459
2002 110,097 11.23 16.58 45.07 54.57 488 499
2003 115,260 10.84 16.37 40.48 54.02 452 460
2004 118,224 12.07 18.28 43.53 54.19 450 458
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Table 4.2a: Difference in Means between LOS and non-LOS schools: 1996
I II III
Full Sample Trimmed on % White Trimmed + IPW
Diff Std. Error Diff Std. Error Diff Std. Error
SAT Verbal 1996 84.2 11.3 60.6 12.9 -76.0 41.0
SAT Math 1996 78.7 11.5 56.9 13.2 -76.6 42.5
% Male1996 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07
% LEP 1996 -9.08 1.06 -5.46 1.45 -1.92 2.91
% Poor 1996 -21.61 2.47 -11.18 2.69 -4.55 6.26
% White 1996 56.14 3.32 31.38 2.54 -0.61 1.67
% Black 1996 -28.67 1.96 -24.30 2.67 -4.35 10.69
% Hispanic 1996 -27.49 3.47 -7.45 3.86 5.57 10.35
% Twelfth Grade 1996 1.29 0.82 1.78 0.85 -1.77 0.89
Teacher Exper. 1996 -1.52 0.30 -1.31 0.31 -0.85 0.73
Stud to Teach. ratio 1996 -3.49 0.40 -2.97 0.46 0.89 0.99
% Taking Exam 1996 9.45 2.30 6.95 2.45 -11.09 6.61
Sent to Austin 1996 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.04 0.04
Sent to UTD 1996 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Sent to A&M 1996 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.10
Notes:
IPW is our acronym for Inverse Probability Weighting.
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Table 4.2b: Difference in Means between CS and non-CS schools: 1996
I II III
Full Sample Trimmed on % White Trimmed + IPW
Diff Std. Error Diff Std. Error Diff Std. Error
SAT Verbal 1996 68.2 15.0 53.0 16.3 -07.0 27.7
SAT Math 1996 59.7 15.1 46.6 16.5 -14.2 28.0
% Male 1996 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02
% LEP 1996 -8.32 1.40 -5.86 1.72 -3.77 2.43
% Poor 1996 -8.94 3.32 -1.42 3.44 6.12 3.86
% White 1996 52.03 4.59 33.75 3.83 6.91 2.96
% Black 1996 -43.78 2.47 -39.99 3.00 -14.09 8.19
% Hispanic 1996 -6.46 4.64 7.79 4.89 8.45 6.96
% Twelfth Grade 1996 1.97 1.07 2.36 1.07 0.97 1.11
Teacher Exper. 1996 -1.79 0.40 -1.49 0.39 -0.88 0.66
Stud. to Teach. ratio 1996 -4.25 0.52 -3.82 0.56 -0.49 0.54
% Taking Exam 1996 7.14 2.96 5.65 3.04 -3.99 3.57
Sent to Austin 1996 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.04
Sent to UTD 1996 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Sent to A&M 1996 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02
Notes:
IPW is our acronym for Inverse Probability Weighting.
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Table 4.3: Score Report Sending Behavior
Mean Number of Scores Sent: Proportion of Scores Sent:
In In To To To To To To
Year Total State TTPR schools TX 2yr college UT Austin UT Dallas Texas A&M selective TX college
1996 4.29 3.11 1.75 0.34 0.355 0.031 0.312 0.514
1997 4.27 3.10 1.74 0.35 0.343 0.034 0.296 0.498
1998 4.08 2.97 1.67 0.34 0.334 0.034 0.281 0.480
1999 3.98 2.91 1.64 0.33 0.330 0.034 0.278 0.475
2000 4.05 2.97 1.70 0.34 0.352 0.043 0.288 0.499
2001 4.06 2.95 1.69 0.33 0.337 0.046 0.281 0.484
2002 4.02 2.95 1.70 0.32 0.328 0.053 0.265 0.470
2003 3.97 2.93 1.72 0.31 0.332 0.056 0.253 0.466
2004 3.86 2.88 1.69 0.31 0.315 0.058 0.233 0.443
Table 4.4a: Number of Taker within class rank
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Total
1996 8,651 15,678 16,286 21,162 16,553 3,064 604 1,771 83,769
1997 9,528 16,182 17,093 21,674 16,983 3,308 630 2,352 87,750
1998 11,019 16,838 17,582 23,204 18,727 3,569 695 2,502 94,136
1999 13,229 17,311 18,483 23,776 19,133 3,730 773 2,295 98,730
2000 16,677 17,912 19,051 23,192 19,232 3,797 823 2,683 103,367
2001 22,258 18,202 18,623 21,438 17,792 3,495 729 2,478 105,015
2002 31,548 17,817 18,218 19,310 16,724 3,381 763 2,336 110,097
2003 27,176 17,693 17,510 17,567 15,338 3,098 704 16,174 115,260
2004 33,829 18,933 18,846 17,622 15,858 3,406 807 8,923 118,224
Note the increasing proportion that do not provide rank
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Table 4.4b: Proportion Taking conditional on rank reported
year top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint
1996 1.02 0.93 0.52 0.43 0.13 0.06
1997 1.01 0.93 0.52 0.42 0.12 0.06
1998 0.98 0.90 0.51 0.43 0.13 0.06
1999 0.95 0.91 0.50 0.42 0.12 0.05
2000 0.97 0.89 0.50 0.42 0.13 0.07
2001 0.96 0.89 0.46 0.40 0.12 0.05
2002 0.92 0.87 0.43 0.37 0.13 0.06
2003 0.90 0.81 0.38 0.34 0.10 0.05
2004 0.90 0.83 0.38 0.34 0.11 0.05
Table 4.4c: Mean of SAT Verbal by class Rank
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 412.59 560.67 491.05 451.29 400.73 354.39 323.00 404.24 460.04
1997 409.32 558.26 489.88 451.78 401.79 359.40 312.10 408.78 458.91
1998 414.18 557.35 489.49 450.18 396.57 351.26 309.63 398.29 455.64
1999 420.49 558.94 486.29 445.38 395.49 345.47 304.42 371.25 453.35
2000 424.51 556.36 486.25 446.74 396.64 347.87 303.03 377.37 453.53
2001 430.66 555.35 482.66 441.31 393.78 342.59 312.73 363.80 452.09
2002 483.85 567.01 503.02 468.48 433.83 403.11 391.88 426.55 487.75
2003 432.26 553.92 478.71 431.74 382.32 331.86 297.32 463.76 452.16
2004 426.76 552.46 480.72 430.55 385.40 336.66 304.36 464.98 449.96
Table 4.4d: Mean of SAT Math by class Rank
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans. Overall
1996 409.78 579.89 501.58 455.39 399.39 354.20 323.39 410.01 466.28
1997 409.55 578.17 501.47 458.20 402.92 358.52 318.43 411.77 466.77
1998 413.80 576.98 500.83 456.63 397.77 350.07 313.60 406.12 463.25
1999 420.04 575.89 496.49 449.57 394.06 343.22 301.51 376.52 458.92
2000 426.37 575.69 498.25 453.16 397.10 343.45 303.78 383.75 460.93
2001 432.98 574.87 494.29 447.49 393.59 339.02 309.14 370.52 459.27
2002 490.49 588.62 518.06 479.01 436.91 405.01 400.19 437.22 498.54
2003 435.62 573.47 491.72 437.26 383.36 331.02 296.58 472.41 460.10
2004 429.93 568.76 492.44 437.97 386.93 335.48 308.20 478.64 457.68
Table 4.5a: Number of Scores Sent
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 3.36 5.39 4.63 4.24 3.83 3.43 3.26 2.80 4.29
1997 3.39 5.39 4.55 4.25 3.81 3.51 3.22 2.77 4.27
1998 3.22 5.24 4.43 4.05 3.61 3.26 3.08 2.75 4.08
1999 3.21 5.06 4.3 3.98 3.59 3.24 3.12 2.53 3.98
2000 3.32 5.06 4.41 4.11 3.71 3.39 3.16 2.51 4.05
2001 3.32 5.09 4.45 4.14 3.77 3.49 3.33 2.63 4.06
2002 3.43 5.00 4.41 4.17 3.81 3.53 3.35 2.74 4.02
2003 3.50 4.94 4.36 4.12 3.80 3.57 3.34 3.380 3.97
2004 3.29 4.77 4.22 3.98 3.67 3.41 3.39 3.73 3.86
Table 4.5b: Number of Scores Sent within Texas
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 2.58 3.38 3.33 3.21 3.00 2.72 2.58 2.15 3.11
1997 2.59 3.40 3.30 3.22 2.98 2.74 2.47 2.15 3.10
1998 2.45 3.34 3.21 3.07 2.81 2.56 2.46 2.15 2.97
1999 2.41 3.19 3.14 3.03 2.81 2.56 2.41 1.97 2.91
2000 2.53 3.22 3.22 3.11 2.91 2.67 2.47 1.99 2.97
2001 2.52 3.17 3.23 3.11 2.93 2.71 2.69 2.05 2.95
2002 2.58 3.16 3.26 3.19 2.98 2.81 2.67 2.15 2.95
2003 2.68 3.16 3.24 3.16 2.98 2.81 2.62 2.52 2.93
2004 2.54 3.11 3.17 3.13 2.92 2.72 2.71 2.61 2.88
Table 4.5c: Number of Scores Sent to TTPR schools
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 1.42 1.82 1.90 1.88 1.70 1.41 1.26 1.16 1.75
1997 1.41 1.83 1.90 1.87 1.68 1.43 1.16 1.17 1.74
1998 1.32 1.80 1.85 1.80 1.59 1.32 1.19 1.14 1.67
1999 1.34 1.75 1.81 1.76 1.60 1.36 1.19 1.02 1.64
2000 1.43 1.80 1.88 1.83 1.66 1.43 1.23 1.07 1.70
2001 1.44 1.78 1.90 1.83 1.67 1.46 1.40 1.14 1.69
2002 1.49 1.80 1.94 1.87 1.68 1.50 1.31 1.15 1.70
2003 1.56 1.83 1.95 1.90 1.70 1.50 1.24 1.53 1.72
2004 1.47 1.82 1.93 1.86 1.68 1.46 1.31 1.57 1.69
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Table 4.5d: Number of Scores Sent to TX 2yr colleges
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.39 0.17 0.28 0.35 0.48 0.62 0.67 0.36 0.34
1997 0.41 0.17 0.29 0.37 0.48 0.61 0.68 0.37 0.35
1998 0.38 0.18 0.27 0.35 0.44 0.58 0.63 0.40 0.34
1999 0.36 0.16 0.27 0.35 0.44 0.54 0.56 0.39 0.33
2000 0.36 0.16 0.28 0.36 0.47 0.59 0.62 0.40 0.34
2001 0.33 0.15 0.27 0.35 0.46 0.55 0.64 0.43 0.33
2002 0.29 0.14 0.27 0.36 0.46 0.59 0.68 0.49 0.32
2003 0.32 0.14 0.28 0.37 0.48 0.62 0.70 0.25 0.31
2004 0.32 0.14 0.26 0.37 0.47 0.59 0.69 0.24 0.31
Table 4.5e: Number of Scores Sent to UT Austin
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.25 0.51 0.42 0.36 0.25 0.17 0.12 0.22 0.35
1997 0.24 0.49 0.40 0.35 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.20 0.342
1998 0.24 0.49 0.41 0.33 0.24 0.16 0.12 0.20 0.33
1999 0.26 0.49 0.40 0.32 0.24 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.33
2000 0.29 0.51 0.42 0.35 0.26 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.35
2001 0.27 0.52 0.41 0.33 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.34
2002 0.28 0.53 0.40 0.30 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.33
2003 0.27 0.54 0.40 0.31 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.31 0.33
2004 0.24 0.53 0.39 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.34 0.32
Table 4.5f: Number of Scores Sent to UT Dallas
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
1997 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03
1998 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.0 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03
1999 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03
2000 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04
2001 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05
2002 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05
2003 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06
2004 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06
Table 4.5g: Number of Scores Sent to Texas A&M
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.21 0.45 0.38 0.31 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.31
1997 0.20 0.43 0.37 0.30 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.30
1998 0.19 0.41 0.36 0.28 0.19 0.13 0.10 0.18 0.28
1999 0.20 0.41 0.35 0.28 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.28
2000 0.22 0.42 0.36 0.29 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.29
2001 0.22 0.42 0.36 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.28
2002 0.23 0.40 0.34 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.27
2003 0.20 0.39 0.33 0.24 0.16 0.116 0.07 0.24 0.25
2004 0.18 0.36 0.30 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.26 0.23
Table 4.5h: Number of Scores Sent to a selective school
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.49 0.99 0.83 0.71 0.49 0.33 0.27 0.41 0.70
1997 0.47 0.96 0.81 0.69 0.48 0.34 0.26 0.38 0.67
1998 0.45 0.95 0.80 0.65 0.46 0.32 0.26 0.40 0.65
1999 0.48 0.94 0.78 0.64 0.46 0.32 0.28 0.34 0.64
2000 0.55 0.98 0.82 0.69 0.51 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.68
2001 0.53 0.99 0.82 0.66 0.47 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.66
2002 0.56 0.99 0.81 0.63 0.43 0.32 0.28 0.32 0.65
2003 0.53 0.99 0.79 0.61 0.43 0.30 0.25 0.60 0.64
2004 0.47 0.96 0.76 0.57 0.41 0.28 0.29 0.66 0.61
Table 4.5i: Proportion who send to at least one selective school
year Q not ans top decile 2nd decile 2nd quintile 3rd quint 4th quint 5th quint SDQ not ans Overall
1996 0.38 0.71 0.60 0.52 0.38 0.27 0.23 0.31 0.51
1997 0.36 0.69 0.59 0.51 0.37 0.28 0.21 0.29 0.50
1998 0.35 0.68 0.58 0.48 0.35 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.48
1999 0.37 0.68 0.57 0.47 0.36 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.48
2000 0.41 0.70 0.59 0.50 0.39 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.50
2001 0.39 0.71 0.58 0.48 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.48
2002 0.40 0.70 0.57 0.46 0.34 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.47
2003 0.39 0.70 0.56 0.45 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.43 0.47
2004 0.35 0.68 0.54 0.42 0.32 0.23 0.23 0.47 0.44
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Table 4.6a: Number of Takers by LOS x CS schools
LOS=0 LOS=1 LOS=0 LOS=1
CS=0 CS=0 CS=1 CS=1
1996 73574 5369 1802 3024
1997 77113 5704 1845 3088
1998 82870 6221 1829 3216
1999 86909 6612 1774 3435
2000 91058 6981 1796 3532
2001 92824 6898 1774 3519
2002 97596 7242 1663 3596
2003 102307 7425 1880 3648
2004 104945 7746 1909 3624
Table 4.6b: Proportion of 12th Graders taking an SAT by LOS x CS schools
LOS=0 LOS=1 LOS=0 LOS=1
CS=0 CS=0 CS=1 CS=1
1996 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.47
1997 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.45
1998 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.46
1999 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.50
2000 0.49 0.51 0.45 0.51
2001 0.49 0.53 0.44 0.52
2002 0.50 0.54 0.42 0.55
2003 0.49 0.53 0.43 0.54
2004 0.49 0.56 0.42 0.54
Table 4.6c: Proportion of SAT Takers sending to UT Austin by LOS x CS Schools
LOS=0 LOS=1 LOS=0 LOS=1
year CS=0 CS=0 CS=1 CS=1
1996 0.36 0.23 0.31 0.20
1997 0.35 0.21 0.30 0.18
1998 0.34 0.22 0.27 0.17
1999 0.34 0.21 0.29 0.18
2000 0.36 0.24 0.28 0.20
2001 0.34 0.26 0.30 0.20
2002 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.21
2003 0.32 0.26 0.27 0.22
2004 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.23
Table 4.7: Proportion Taking SAT and Sending to UT Austin
Prop. SAT Prop. Austin—SAT
Year LOS=0 LOS=1 LOS=0 LOS=1
1996 0.39 0.44 0.24 0.23
1997 0.42 0.43 0.22 0.21
1998 0.37 0.47 0.20 0.20
1999 0.33 0.49 0.22 0.20
2000 0.45 0.52 0.23 0.24
2001 0.45 0.53 0.18 0.26
2002 0.42 0.55 0.19 0.25
2003 0.40 0.53 0.24 0.25
2004 0.41 0.57 0.24 0.26
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Table 4.8: Individual level regressions for score-report sending w/o fixed effects
Dependent Variables
> 4 scores # scores non-select selective Austin TTPR In-state
Trend 0.001 -0.01 0.009 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0
[0.001] [0.004]* [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-period 0 0.007 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.004 0
[0.003] [0.015] [0.003]* [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002]* [0.001]
NoRank -0.089 -0.499 -0.071 -0.009 -0.007 -0.031 -0.008
[0.004]** [0.024]** [0.006]** [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]** [0.002]**
1st decile 0.186 0.984 -0.109 0.201 0.157 -0.006 0.003
[0.005]** [0.027]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.004] [0.002]
2nd decile 0.084 0.442 -0.043 0.152 0.112 0.012 0.004
[0.004]** [0.019]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.002]**
2nd quintile 0.052 0.241 -0.008 0.097 0.073 0.016 0.004
[0.003]** [0.018]** [0.004] [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.001]**
4th quintile -0.035 -0.208 -0.024 -0.071 -0.045 -0.042 -0.008
[0.005]** [0.032]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.003]*
5th quintile -0.049 -0.343 -0.08 -0.095 -0.076 -0.074 -0.017
[0.011]** [0.063]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.010]** [0.014]** [0.007]*
Post 0.001 -0.105 -0.022 0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001
[0.004] [0.022]** [0.005]** [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
Post×NoRank 0.036 0.014 -0.004 0.007 0.017 0.006 0.002
[0.004]** [0.026] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004]** [0.005] [0.002]
Post×1st decile -0.056 -0.248 -0.02 0.019 0.038 0.005 0
[0.004]** [0.026]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004] [0.002]
Post×2nd decile -0.019 -0.093 -0.003 -0.001 0.012 0.002 0
[0.004]** [0.021]** [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]** [0.003] [0.002]
Post×2nd quintile -0.016 -0.038 -0.002 -0.016 -0.01 -0.005 -0.002
[0.004]** [0.020] [0.004] [0.004]** [0.004]* [0.003] [0.002]
Post×4th quintile 0.005 0.054 0.015 0.013 0.007 0.016 0.004
[0.006] [0.035] [0.007]* [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]* [0.004]
Post×5th quintile 0.008 0.123 0.031 0.044 0.046 0.022 0.015
[0.012] [0.069] [0.016]* [0.014]** [0.011]** [0.015] [0.008]
Constant 0.314 3.849 0.792 0.353 0.431 0.596 0.97
[0.072]** [0.442]** [0.121]** [0.057]** [0.066]** [0.053]** [0.019]**
Observations 865490 865490 865490 865490 865490 751339 751339
R2 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.01 0
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, student-to-teacher ratio, teacher experience,
and whether the school subsequently gets LOS or CS.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable
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Table 4.9: Individual level regressions for score-report sending with fixed effects
Dependent Variables
> 4 scores # scores non-select selective Austin TTPR In-state
Trend 0.003 0.007 0.012 -0.004 -0.002 0 0
[0.001]** [0.005] [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.000] [0.000]
Pre-period 0 0.014 0.008 0.01 0.008 0.003 0
[0.003] [0.015] [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002] [0.001]
NoRank -0.09 -0.505 -0.07 -0.004 -0.003 -0.026 -0.008
[0.004]** [0.022]** [0.005]** [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]** [0.002]**
1st decile 0.213 1.104 -0.113 0.214 0.176 -0.007 0
[0.004]** [0.025]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.003]* [0.002]
2nd decile 0.1 0.515 -0.044 0.158 0.122 0.012 0.002
[0.004]** [0.019]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.002]
2nd quintile 0.06 0.279 -0.008 0.099 0.077 0.016 0.002
[0.003]** [0.018]** [0.004]* [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.001]
4th quintile -0.046 -0.268 -0.021 -0.072 -0.048 -0.04 -0.006
[0.005]** [0.032]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.003]
5th quintile -0.067 -0.439 -0.074 -0.092 -0.073 -0.069 -0.013
[0.011]** [0.062]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.011]** [0.013]** [0.007]
Post 0.002 -0.107 -0.026 0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002
[0.004] [0.022]** [0.004]** [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Post×NoRank 0.036 0.016 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.002
[0.004]** [0.024] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004]* [0.004] [0.002]
Post×1st decile -0.059 -0.261 -0.018 0.018 0.036 0.007 0
[0.004]** [0.026]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003] [0.002]
Post×2nd decile -0.021 -0.1 -0.002 -0.002 0.01 0.003 0
[0.004]** [0.022]** [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]* [0.003] [0.002]
Post×2nd quintile -0.017 -0.044 -0.003 -0.016 -0.01 -0.004 -0.002
[0.004]** [0.021]* [0.004] [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003] [0.002]
Post×4th quintile 0.007 0.061 0.012 0.011 0.005 0.015 0.004
[0.005] [0.034] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]* [0.004]
Post×5th quintile 0.013 0.144 0.023 0.038 0.039 0.016 0.014
[0.012] [0.069]* [0.015] [0.014]** [0.011]** [0.015] [0.008]
Constant 0.028 1.854 0.447 -0.041 -0.094 0.775 0.933
[0.067] [0.570]** [0.069]** [0.103] [0.105] [0.074]** [0.020]**
Observations 865490 865490 865490 865490 865490 751339 751339
R2 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.02
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, teacher student ratio, teacher experience
and whether the school subsequently gets LOS or CS.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable
5. Estimates of high school level fixed effects have been suppressed.
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Table 4.10: Difference-in-Differences estimates for LOS program w/o fixed effects
Dependent Variables
Austin # scores non-select selective TTPR In-State > 4 scores
Trend 0.006 -0.014 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.001 -0.004
[0.002]** [0.014] [0.004]** [0.002]* [0.002]** [0.001] [0.002]
No Rank 0.006 -0.526 -0.062 -0.013 -0.028 0.007 -0.109
[0.015] [0.058]** [0.013]** [0.013] [0.015] [0.005] [0.010]**
1st decile 0.184 1.079 -0.1 0.2 0.02 0.013 0.237
[0.012]** [0.070]** [0.016]** [0.019]** [0.012] [0.010] [0.015]**
2nd decile 0.101 0.514 -0.009 0.127 0.036 0.014 0.112
[0.020]** [0.060]** [0.012] [0.023]** [0.011]** [0.007]* [0.012]**
2nd quintile 0.036 0.325 0.007 0.039 0.019 0.014 0.084
[0.010]** [0.080]** [0.012] [0.013]** [0.009]* [0.009] [0.018]**
4th quintile -0.02 -0.195 -0.026 -0.049 0.005 0.012 -0.035
[0.020] [0.057]** [0.027] [0.016]** [0.028] [0.015] [0.009]**
5th quintile -0.034 -0.367 -0.14 -0.095 -0.08 0.003 -0.055
[0.035] [0.087]** [0.026]** [0.026]** [0.037]* [0.022] [0.017]**
LOS×No Rank -0.009 -0.033 -0.015 -0.002 -0.013 0.003 -0.001
[0.014] [0.094] [0.014] [0.013] [0.015] [0.004] [0.013]
LOS×1st decile 0.097 0.12 0.049 0.082 0.054 0.012 0.035
[0.013]** [0.085] [0.016]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.005]** [0.015]*
LOS×2nd decile 0.034 0.115 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.008 0.023
[0.011]** [0.076] [0.013] [0.013] [0.009]* [0.004] [0.013]
LOS×2nd quintile 0.022 0.109 0.018 0.034 0.002 0.012 0.02
[0.009]** [0.097] [0.019] [0.013]** [0.012] [0.006] [0.019]
LOS×3rd quintile 0.004 0.149 0.008 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 0.019
[0.012] [0.098] [0.016] [0.015] [0.013] [0.007] [0.017]
LOS×4th quintile -0.002 0.059 0.025 0.011 0.01 0.007 -0.006
[0.014] [0.119] [0.025] [0.015] [0.016] [0.007] [0.017]
LOS×5th quintile -0.035 0.061 0.064 -0.03 -0.037 -0.011 -0.019
[0.031] [0.231] [0.036] [0.028] [0.043] [0.013] [0.042]
LOS School -0.034 -0.076 -0.003 -0.035 -0.015 -0.008 -0.004
[0.012]** [0.097] [0.027] [0.015]* [0.014] [0.004] [0.018]
Constant -11.918 27.432 -22.176 -7.302 -12.066 -0.696 7.636
[3.925]** [27.447] [8.036]** [3.817] [3.146]** [1.244] [4.187]
Observations 189354 189354 189354 189354 167646 167646 189354
R2 0.09 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.02 0.01 0.11
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, student-to-teacher ratio, teacher experience,
,whether the school subsequently gets CS, the ‘pre’ dummy, the post dummy,
and interactions between the post dummy and rank categories.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable.
5. Estimates of high school level fixed effects have been suppressed.
6. The common support condition has been imposed.
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Table 4.11: Difference-in-Differences estimates for LOS program with fixed effects
Dependent Variables
Austin # scores non-select selective TTPR In-State > 4 scores
Trend 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001
[0.002]** [0.016] [0.003]** [0.002]* [0.002]** [0.001]* [0.002]
No Rank 0.01 -0.537 -0.054 -0.012 -0.018 0.006 -0.112
[0.014] [0.052]** [0.012]** [0.012] [0.013] [0.006] [0.010]**
1st decile 0.184 1.101 -0.075 0.191 0.022 0.012 0.246
[0.011]** [0.066]** [0.016]** [0.020]** [0.011]* [0.010] [0.014]**
2nd decile 0.101 0.518 0.007 0.12 0.036 0.013 0.116
[0.019]** [0.062]** [0.012] [0.022]** [0.010]** [0.007]* [0.011]**
2nd quintile 0.037 0.33 0.011 0.038 0.02 0.014 0.087
[0.010]** [0.082]** [0.011] [0.014]** [0.009]* [0.009] [0.018]**
4th quintile -0.021 -0.201 -0.025 -0.049 0.002 0.011 -0.036
[0.020] [0.053]** [0.027] [0.016]** [0.028] [0.015] [0.009]**
5th quintile -0.034 -0.376 -0.128 -0.098 -0.081 0.002 -0.06
[0.035] [0.089]** [0.027]** [0.026]** [0.038]* [0.022] [0.018]**
LOS×No Rank -0.005 -0.037 -0.021 0.004 -0.009 0.002 -0.002
[0.013] [0.083] [0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.004] [0.011]
LOS×1st decile 0.099 0.06 0.039 0.087 0.055 0.011 0.024
[0.013]** [0.074] [0.015]* [0.013]** [0.014]** [0.005]* [0.015]
LOS×2nd decile 0.033 0.075 0.009 0.025 0.018 0.007 0.015
[0.011]** [0.064] [0.011] [0.013] [0.009]* [0.004] [0.012]
LOS×2nd quintile 0.024 0.089 0.009 0.037 -0.001 0.011 0.019
[0.008]** [0.082] [0.016] [0.013]** [0.008] [0.006] [0.016]
LOS×3rd quintile 0.007 0.181 -0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.006 0.026
[0.011] [0.082]* [0.014] [0.014] [0.010] [0.006] [0.014]
LOS×4th quintile 0.002 0.123 0.021 0.023 0.008 0.007 0.007
[0.013] [0.106] [0.018] [0.015] [0.013] [0.006] [0.014]
LOS×5th quintile -0.028 0.196 0.042 -0.01 -0.043 -0.01 0.002
[0.030] [0.224] [0.030] [0.029] [0.042] [0.013] [0.042]
Constant -16.174 -18.633 -27.595 -9.731 -9.352 -1.765 -2.206
[4.340]** [32.106] [5.988]** [4.234]* [3.423]** [1.360] [4.581]
Observations 189354 189354 189354 189354 167646 167646 189354
R2 0.1 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.13
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, student-to-teacher ratio, teacher experience,
,whether the school subsequently gets CS, the ‘pre’ dummy, the post dummy,
and interactions between the post dummy and rank categories.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable
5. Estimates of high school level fixed effects have been suppressed.
6. The common support condition has been imposed.
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Table 4.12: Difference-in-Differences estimates for CS program w/o fixed effects
Dependent Variables
A&M # scores non-select selective TTPR In-State > 4 scores
Trend -0.005 0.031 0.006 0.002 0.001 0 0.005
[0.002]** [0.016] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]**
No Rank -0.015 -0.61 -0.091 -0.03 -0.046 -0.004 -0.105
[0.007]* [0.059]** [0.016]** [0.011]** [0.012]** [0.007] [0.012]**
1st decile 0.144 1.048 -0.091 0.198 0.022 0.009 0.211
[0.016]** [0.095]** [0.025]** [0.018]** [0.016] [0.007] [0.014]**
2nd decile 0.081 0.459 -0.029 0.108 0.018 0.008 0.103
[0.011]** [0.060]** [0.016] [0.014]** [0.012] [0.006] [0.012]**
2nd quintile 0.042 0.231 -0.002 0.054 0.013 0.005 0.063
[0.008]** [0.050]** [0.013] [0.013]** [0.010] [0.006] [0.008]**
4th quintile -0.037 -0.164 -0.052 -0.08 -0.041 -0.023 -0.024
[0.017]* [0.090] [0.015]** [0.020]** [0.021]* [0.015] [0.015]
5th quintile -0.065 -0.235 -0.121 -0.13 -0.124 -0.023 -0.031
[0.023]** [0.146] [0.039]** [0.030]** [0.047]** [0.036] [0.028]
CS×No Rank 0.023 -0.241 -0.046 0.033 0.001 0.003 -0.024
[0.014] [0.112]* [0.026] [0.014]* [0.012] [0.005] [0.017]
CS×1st decile 0.039 -0.287 0.016 0.04 0.036 0.004 -0.042
[0.019]* [0.085]** [0.022] [0.015]** [0.016]* [0.006] [0.014]**
CS×2nd decile 0.014 -0.251 -0.015 -0.001 -0.005 0.006 -0.05
[0.014] [0.090]** [0.016] [0.015] [0.011] [0.005] [0.017]**
CS×2nd quintile 0.012 -0.147 -0.023 0.025 -0.009 0.008 -0.028
[0.013] [0.095] [0.020] [0.015] [0.013] [0.006] [0.015]
CS×3rd quintile 0.02 -0.127 -0.057 0.018 -0.009 -0.003 -0.02
[0.011] [0.096] [0.021]** [0.015] [0.014] [0.007] [0.016]
CS×4th quintile 0.015 -0.004 -0.082 0.021 -0.057 0.005 -0.019
[0.017] [0.157] [0.029]** [0.026] [0.032] [0.011] [0.017]
CS×5th quintile 0.019 -0.31 -0.097 0.062 -0.018 0.016 -0.059
[0.033] [0.256] [0.047]* [0.041] [0.048] [0.011] [0.054]
CS School 0.001 -0.148 -0.01 -0.035 -0.054 -0.004 -0.02
[0.012] [0.089] [0.034] [0.014]* [0.014]** [0.005] [0.015]
Constant 11.311 -56.196 -11.322 -4.115 -1.365 1.348 -10.304
[3.363]** [31.809] [7.282] [4.049] [3.617] [1.102] [4.192]*
Observations 265849 265849 265849 265849 233562 233562 265849
R2 0.07 0.1 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.11
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, student-to-teacher ratio, teacher experience,
,whether the school subsequently gets LOS, the ‘pre’ dummy, the post dummy,
and interactions between the post dummy and rank categories.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable.
5. Estimates of high school level fixed effects have been suppressed.
6. The common support condition has been imposed.
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Table 4.13: Difference-in-Differences estimates for CS program with fixed effects
Dependent Variables
A&M # scores non-select selective TTPR In-State > 4 scores
Trend -0.006 0.02 0.014 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003
[0.002]** [0.017] [0.003]** [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
No Rank -0.015 -0.602 -0.08 -0.031 -0.042 -0.004 -0.105
[0.007]* [0.061]** [0.014]** [0.011]** [0.012]** [0.007] [0.012]**
1st decile 0.146 1.086 -0.08 0.2 0.022 0.007 0.223
[0.016]** [0.093]** [0.024]** [0.018]** [0.015] [0.007] [0.014]**
2nd decile 0.082 0.478 -0.022 0.108 0.02 0.007 0.11
[0.011]** [0.062]** [0.016] [0.014]** [0.011] [0.006] [0.013]**
2nd quintile 0.042 0.245 0.002 0.053 0.015 0.005 0.067
[0.008]** [0.048]** [0.013] [0.012]** [0.009] [0.006] [0.008]**
4th quintile -0.037 -0.187 -0.064 -0.079 -0.042 -0.023 -0.028
[0.017]* [0.089]* [0.014]** [0.020]** [0.021]* [0.015] [0.015]
5th quintile -0.058 -0.314 -0.097 -0.14 -0.128 -0.021 -0.045
[0.024]* [0.139]* [0.042]* [0.030]** [0.046]** [0.036] [0.029]
CS×No Rank 0.02 -0.153 -0.038 0.034 -0.001 0.004 -0.015
[0.012] [0.100] [0.021] [0.012]** [0.011] [0.004] [0.014]
CS×1st decile 0.042 -0.27 0.004 0.045 0.037 0.006 -0.042
[0.019]* [0.084]** [0.022] [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.005] [0.012]**
CS×2nd decile 0.016 -0.229 -0.018 -0.002 -0.006 0.008 -0.048
[0.015] [0.080]** [0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.005] [0.014]**
CS×2nd quintile 0.011 -0.111 -0.022 0.021 -0.008 0.009 -0.024
[0.013] [0.088] [0.016] [0.015] [0.011] [0.005] [0.012]
CS×3rd quintile 0.017 -0.096 -0.042 0.009 -0.009 -0.001 -0.016
[0.011] [0.087] [0.018]* [0.014] [0.013] [0.007] [0.014]
CS×4th quintile 0.005 0.014 -0.062 0.011 -0.053 0.007 -0.018
[0.016] [0.144] [0.025]* [0.025] [0.032] [0.011] [0.015]
CS×5th quintile 0.002 -0.31 -0.099 0.06 -0.002 0.013 -0.058
[0.034] [0.248] [0.046]* [0.040] [0.046] [0.011] [0.054]
Constant 12.598 -37.769 -28.606 6.149 -3.742 -0.063 -6.191
[3.296]** [34.452] [5.481]** [4.379] [3.571] [1.430] [4.563]
Observations 265849 265849 265849 265849 233562 233562 265849
R2 0.08 0.13 0.1 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.13
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in brackets
2. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
3. Omitted coefficients include SAT math and verbal scores, racial composition of the
school, % poor, numbers in 12th grade, student-to-teacher ratio, teacher experience,
,whether the school subsequently gets LOS, the ‘pre’ dummy, the post dummy,
and interactions between the post dummy and rank categories.
4. All dependent variables are 0 - 1 indicators, except for Col 2 which is a count variable
5. Estimates of high school level fixed effects have been suppressed.




Figure 4.1: Propensity Score Histograms for LOS Schools
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Figure 4.2: Adjusted Propensity Score Histograms for LOS Schools
125
Figure 4.3: Propensity Score Histograms for CS Schools
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Figure 4.4: Adjusted Propensity Score Histograms for CS Schools
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The first chapter of the dissertation investigates how poor households in developing
countries respond to adverse income developments. I use nationally representative longi-
tudinal data to investigate behavioral responses to the loss of an Old Age Pensioner in
South Africa. I find that household composition adjusts, with an outflow of school aged
children and an inflow of middle-aged females and older adults. The household, on ag-
gregate, also has more people employed. Conditional on compositional stability within
demographic groups, I find large and significant increases in both labor supply and em-
ployment. Policy makers might be concerned with the impact of cash transfers on the
labor supply of non-recipients.
The second chapter examines the effect of the Old Age Pension on retirement behavior
of elderly South Africans. I make use of the rules on age eligibility to measure changes in
various dimensions of labor supply that occur when people reach the pensionable age. I find
significant decreases in employment rates and labor supply. Those who remain employed
beyond the pensionable age are more likely to work in jobs with flexible hours of work,
and work even fewer hours than people in similar jobs who are not pension age-eligible.
The final chapter investigates the impact of changes in the probability of being admitted
into a selective college on students’ SAT score sending behavior. We capture this using a
student’s class rank combined with the Texas Top Ten Percent Rule. In response to dwin-
dling minority enrollment rates, the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M College
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Station embarked on targeted recruitment programs at previously under-represented high
schools. We evaluate the effectiveness of these programs using individual level SAT data.
We find that score sending is affected by the legal change, and that both targeted recruit-
ment programs were successful in attracting scores. In each case, the effects were manifest
most strongly amongst the students in the top decile of the class. This suggests that
students from poor schools face multiple barriers to obtaining postsecondary schooling at
selective colleges.
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